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The Use of Offensive Force in
U.N. Peacekeeping:
A Cycle of Boom and Bust?
By JAMES SLOAN*
The nonviolent nature of United Nations peacekeeping operations
is at the same time their most important and their least understood
characteristic.
- Sir Brian Urquhart, former U.N. Under Secretary-General'
I. Introduction
Fifty years ago, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold
famously observed that the legal basis for U.N. peacekeeping may be
found at "Chapter V1 " of the U.N. Charter.2 Today, however, his
message - that peacekeeping, though more than a Chapter VI
peaceful measure, ought to be something less than a forceful measure
under Chapter VII - is being ignored by the United Nations.
Corresponding with the new millennium, a trend in U.N.
peacekeeping has emerged whereby the line between peacekeeping
and enforcement has been blurred: Peacekeeping missions have
become progressively more forceful, more proactive and, in some
cases, have been authorized to use "all necessary means" to achieve
Lecturer in International Law, University of Glasgow School of Law. Much of the
research for this article was undertaken while I was a visiting scholar at University of
California, Hastings College of the Law. I am extremely grateful for the privilege of
this association. I am also very grateful to Dr. Catriona Drew, Professor Nigel White,
Akbar Rasulov, and Professor Joel Paul for reading and commenting on earlier
drafts.
1. F.T. Liu, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE 7
(1992).
2. This phrase is frequently attributed to Hammarskjbld, see, e.g., John Hillen,
Peace(keeping) in Our Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager,
PARAMETERS 17, 17 (Autumn 1996).
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their objectives. This recent tendency to bestow forceful mandates on
peacekeeping operations ignores the lessons of the past. In the 1960s
and again in the 1990s, U.N. peacekeeping operations were given
tasks requiring the use of a considerable degree of force and in each
case the experiment failed.
The rule that force should only be used in self-defense - the
"self-defense principle" - has long been accepted as fundamental to
U.N. peacekeeping,3 along with the requirements of obtaining the
consent of the host state4 and maintaining impartiality. Although
these three characteristics - referred to by some as the "holy trinity"
of peacekeeping - are interlinked,5 this article focuses on the self-
defense principle. This article considers the development of the self-
defense principle, its parameters, and instances where the United
Nations has strayed from it, in the direction of enforcement.6 It also
considers whether, in light of the recent trend to establish more
robust peacekeeping missions under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
self-defense principle applies to current-day peacekeeping.
3. The self-defense principle is described by one expert as "the touchstone of
the right of peacekeepers to use force." Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force
by the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 81 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.) (1991).
Another describes the self-defense principle as "integral to the whole concept of
peacekeeping." Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force by Peacekeepers Beyond Self-
Defence: Some Politico-Legal Implications, in PEACEKEEPING WITH MUSCLE: THE
USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 51, 52 (Alex Morrison,
Douglas A. Fraser & James D. Kiras, eds.) (1997).
4. To many, the "consent principle" goes beyond the need to obtain the consent
of the state or states where the peacekeeping operation is to be emplaced and refers
to the need for the consent of other U.N. member states to contribute forces to a
peacekeeping operation. There is also, of course, the need for the consent of all five
permanent members of the Security Council to a peacekeeping operation, as
reflected by the need for each to vote in favor of the resolution establishing the
operation (or at least abstain on the issue).
5. For example, whether a mission has the consent of all parties will impact its
need to use force; whether a mission maintains the appearance of impartiality will
impact on whether it is viewed as a threat by the parties which, in turn, will impact on
its need to resort to force. Findlay observed that "[i]t is a logical concomitant of the
[self-defense] principle that peacekeepers should be deployed and operate only with
the consent of the parties to a conflict and should observe strict impartiality in their
dealings with the parties. As a tool of conflict prevention, management and
resolution, peacekeeping is not sustainable if it leads to an escalation in violence,
especially if, as a result, peacekeepers are perceived to have become parties to the
conflict. In such circumstances consent is lost and impartiality forfeited." Findlay,
supra note 3, at 52-53.
6. See infra notes 14-25 and corresponding text for a discussion of the use of the
term "enforcement."
[Vol. 30:3
The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping
This article illustrates the United Nations' tendency to waiver
between upholding the self-defense principle and straying from it.
7
First I consider the United Nations' vacillation during the period of
the Cold War. During this period, there was initially little call for the
use of force and little discussion of when such force would be
appropriate. In 1958, parameters for peacekeeping were set and the
United Nations placed a strong emphasis on the self-defense
principle. This period was followed by the controversial United
Nations Mission in the Congo ("ONUC"), when the self-defense
principle was largely ignored and the mission was given enforcement-
type functions. As a result of problems that emerged - some argue
that ONUC nearly led to the demise of U.N. peacekeeping, if not the
United Nations as a whole - the importance of the self-defense
principle was again highlighted by the United Nations. By now,
however, the concept of self-defense was expanded to include
"defense of the mandate."
The second part of this article considers the period after the Cold
War. At that stage, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
introduced An Agenda for Peace,8 which effectively called for the
merger of peacekeeping and enforcement in certain circumstances.
The theories set out in An Agenda for Peace were applied to the
operations in Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, Haiti;
with each mission the self-defense principle was, once again, largely
7. A similar, though more elaborate, pattern was described was described by
John Hillen in a hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He spoke of a recurring
pattern of five stages. First, the Security Council experiments with small
peacekeeping missions in supportive environments. Second, emboldened by its
success with the first type of mission, it mandates bigger and more coercive military
missions that often take place in a more belligerent environment. Third, when "the
challenges of managing these big missions in dangerous environments tend to
overwhelm the U.N. and it fails," it tries to improvise. Fourth, discredited by these
failures, it retreats to a more traditional role. Finally, possibly decades later, "armed
with short memories and with the wounds healed," the United Nations returns to
"playing a much more central role in being the strategic manager of ambitious and
large and complex military operations." United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and
Their Proliferation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Operations on
the Comm. of Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. (2002) (statement of John Hillen, U.S.
Comm. on Nat'l Security/21st Century) available at <frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senatehearings&docid=f:65701.pdf>.
8. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Agenda for
Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-
S/24111 (Jun. 17, 1992) available at <www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html>
[hereinafter "Agenda for Peace"].
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ignored. These missions were generally considered failures. In the
period following these operations, a chastened United Nations placed
a renewed emphasis on the importance of limiting the use of force in
peacekeeping to circumstances of self-defense.
In the third part, this article considers the United Nations'
current approach in returning to the practice of bestowing
enforcement powers on peacekeeping operations in disregard of the
self-defense principle. Since June 1999, new peacekeeping operations
have been established by the U.N. Security Council in ten countries
or regions;9 in nine of these countries or regions, the operations have
been specifically authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
to use considerable force to achieve at leas some of their goals.' °
Remarkably, several of these missions have been authorized to use
"all necessary means" to achieve their objectives - language
traditionally reserved for enforcement actions."
The final section of this article considers the future of U.N.
peacekeeping. Is the United Nations' current move away from the
self-defense principle simply the next installment in a boom-bust
historical cycle of peacekeeping? Will it lead, once again, to forceful
peacekeeping missions ending in disaster, the foundations of
peacekeeping being shaken, and the United Nations hastily calling for
a return to the strict application of the self-defense principle? Or
does it represent the future face of successful U.N. peacekeeping? I
will argue that history suggests the former.
Terminology
No discussion of peacekeeping or related issues may be sensibly
undertaken without dwelling to some extent on definitions. This is
particularly so when considering the forcefulness of peacekeeping
operations. A peacekeeping mission's limited use of force has long
been considered by many to be an essential characteristic of an
operation being classified as peacekeeping, rather than enforcement
9. These countries or regions are as follows: Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire,
Haiti, Burundi, and Sudan.
10. With the tenth country, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Security Council has
recently indicated its intention to take action under Chapter VII if the conduct of the
parties fails to improve. See infra note 242 for a discussion of the current status of the
operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
11. See discussion of the language used by the Security Council in relation to
"necessary measures" infra note 283.
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or, more recently, "peace-enforcement." I will consider each of these
terms - peacekeeping, enforcement, and peace-enforcement - in
turn.
U.N. representatives, commentators, and others disagree about
what type of activity may be classed as U.N. "peacekeeping." The
term "peacekeeping" is not found in the U.N. Charter. There is no
"correct" definition of the term." Some scholars simply accept as
"peacekeeping" whatever the U.N. Secretary-General or the U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations ("DPKO") says is
peacekeeping. However, such an approach is problematic because
the UN Secretariat and Secretary-General have been somewhat
changeable regarding the essential aspects of peacekeeping. 3
For the purposes of this discussion, I rely on the following
definition of "peacekeeping": "U.N. peacekeeping is a Security
Council-authorized force, composed of personnel voluntarily
provided by member states and/or members of the U.N. Secretariat,
operating under the authority of the United Nations and mandated to
assist with the maintenance or restoration of peace through its
activities in situ." Under this definition, the question of how much
force an operation may use and still be characterized as peacekeeping
is deliberately left open. Moreover, this definition deliberately leaves
12. See 1 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY, THE MIDDLE EAST ix (1969) for a valuable
discussion on this point.
13. For example, after years of taking the position that a characteristic of
peacekeeping operations was the non-use of force except in self-defense, in its
December 2003 Peacekeeping Handbook, the U.N. Secretariat conceded that
"sometimes the Security Council will authorize a peacekeeping operation to use
armed force in situations other than in self-defence" (emphasis added). U.N. DEP'T
OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, HANDBOOK ON U.N. MULTIDIMENSIONAL
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 57 (2003) available at <pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/handbook/
Handbook%20on%20UN%20PKOs.pdf>.
Similarly, the definition of peacekeeping posited by the Security Council in
An Agenda for Peace contradicted the position long maintained by previous
Secretaries-General and the Secretariat that consent is always an essential element in
a peacekeeping operation. See discussion infra notes 102-105. Moreover, political
considerations may be involved in a U.N. organ's decision as to whether or not to
characterize a mission as peacekeeping. For example, the Security Council or
Secretariat may favor deeming an operation "peacekeeping" - whether or not such
a characterization is sustainable - because an operation so labeled is likely to be
perceived as being a relatively non-violent endeavor, thereby making it more
acceptable both to the forum state, which will be more likely to consent to the
operation's presence, and to other states, which will be more likely to contribute
troops. See discussion supra note 90 and corresponding text.
20071]
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to one side the related issues of whether host state consent or the
impartiality of the mission are sine qua nons of an operation being
classed as peacekeeping.
It is also necessary for the purposes of this discussion to set out
what is meant by U.N. "enforcement."" The concept of enforcement
is found in the U.N. Charter, though it is not defined therein." The
term refers to a situation where the will of the Security Council is
enforced by means of its Chapter VII authority against an opposing
state either by the imposition of sanctions under Article 41 or, where
necessary, a forceful action under Article 42.16 For the purposes of
this discussion, I use the term "enforcement" to refer to an operation
where the Security Council has authorized force to impose its will,
rather than relying on non-forceful sanctions. 7 In particular, I use the
term "enforcement" to refer to the type of activity where the Security
Council has bestowed its authority to use force to secure its will to a
coalition of the willing ("COTW") - either a grouping of states
(including regional organizations such as NATO 18 or ECOWAS'9) or
an individual state. °
14. To some, peacekeeping may be defined broadly enough to include
enforcement. For the purposes of this discussion, I will continue to use both terms,
while recognizing that a "peacekeeping" operation may be authorized to use
"enforcement" or "enforcement-type" levels of force.
15. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5, 7; art. 5; art. 45; art. 53.
16. "Enforcement action is generally conceived as directed against a State and as
designated to overcome [its] opposing will .... ." Jochen Frowein & Nico Krisch,
Introduction to Chapter VII, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 1,706 (Bruno Simma ed. 2002).
17. Some use the term "enforcement action" to distinguish a forceful action
under Art. 42 from non-forceful enforcement under Art. 41. "Enforcement action" is
sometimes referred to as "collective security."
18. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
19. Economic Community of West African States.
20. While largely beyond the scope of this discussion, it is important to note that
this enforcement - sometimes referred to as "delegated enforcement" - is of a
different nature than the enforcement envisaged under the U.N. Charter. Under the
Charter, the Security Council's will was to be enforced by means of a standing force
established under Art. 43 which would act under the command of the Security
Council. As no such force has ever been agreed to, the Security Council has opted to
proceed by delegating its enforcement powers to coalitions of the willing. Most
scholars have accepted the legality of delegated enforcement operations, based either
on implied power under the Charter or by reference to the Security Council's
practice. See Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of
the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by "Coalitions of the Able and
Willing," 11(3) EUR. J. INT'L. L. 541, 542 (2000); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK,
RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 26
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I consider enforcement operations in two categories. First, I
consider operations where the Security Council has authorized a
COTW to engage in an offensive campaign "against certain elements
or governments."2' Only been two examples of such enforcement -
which I will refer to as "full-blown enforcement, 22 - exist in the
U.N.'s history: the Security Council's authorization to use force in
Korea 3 and its authorization for a U.S.-led COTW to expel Iraq from
Kuwait in 1990 and 1991 ("Operation Desert Storm"). Second, I
refer to the enforcement operations authorized by the United Nations
since the end of the Cold War (with the exception of Operation
Desert Storm) as "quasi-enforcement." Generally speaking, these
operations are of a more limited nature, have fewer troops, and are
not to be directed against one party or government. Instead, these
operations tend to use their enforcement powers to undertake
functions of a more domestic nature, such as facilitating the delivery
of humanitarian aid or the forceful restoration of peace. Moreover,
quasi-enforcement operations are frequently designed to impose
peace in an area in advance of (or concurrently with) a peacekeeping
operation. Examples of "quasi-enforcement" include the Security
Council's 1992 authorization of a U.S.-led operation to use all
necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian
relief in Somalia ("UNITAF" or "Operation Restore Hope") and its
authorization of the U.S.-led operation in 1994 to assist in Haiti
("Multinational Force" or "MFN").
The main basis (along with the issue of consent) of the
(2002), which notes that "[t]extually, Article 42 can stand on its own feet and it now
may be said to do so as a result of Council practice."
21. D.W. BOWETr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY OF UNITED
NATIONS PRAC7ICE 267 (1964).
22. The terms "full-blown enforcement" and "quasi-enforcement" are borrowed
from McCoubrey and White. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, THE
BLUE HELMETS: LEGAL REGULATION OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS
55 (1996). Although many commentators agree that the two examples (Korea and
Iraq/Kuwait) are Art. 42 enforcement actions, not all accept such a characterization.
Instead they would consider either or both of the operations to be self-defense under
Art. 51 of the Charter.
23. The U.N. action in Korea was authorized by the United Nations, the U.N.
flag was flown and contributing governments used the term "U.N. command" when
communicating with it. However, "in military and operational terms, control was
firmly in the hands of the United States." 2 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY, ASIA 195-197 (1970)
[hereinafter "HIGGINS, ASIA"].
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distinction between U.N. peacekeeping operations and U.N.
enforcement operations has traditionally been that the latter were far
less constrained in their use of force. However, now that current
peacekeeping operations are generally authorized to use considerable
force, including, in some cases, "all necessary means" under Chapter
VII, this basis to distinguish the two concepts becomes much harder
to apply. Where a peacekeeping operation is authorized to use an
"enforcement-type" level of force, it becomes necessary to focus on
the question of command and control: A peacekeeping operation is
led by the United Nations, whereas in an enforcement operation
(whether "quasi-enforcement" or "full-blown enforcement"), the
Security Council delegates control24 to a COTW.25 Another important
distinction between enforcement and peacekeeping is that the latter
features the consent of the host state - though, acknowledgedly,
there may be issues (beyond the scope of this discussion) regarding
whether true "consent" may be obtained from a state whose
government has broken down, such as Somalia in the 1990s.
However, if one accepts the current tendency of the Security Council
to specifically rely on Chapter VII of the Charter and the "all
necessary means" language in establishing some peacekeeping
operations, it is not such a stretch to argue that consent to a
peacekeeping operation may no longer be required. As we shall see,
this was the approach of Boutros-Ghali in the early 1990s.
Finally, another frequently invoked term, "peace-enforcement,"
deserves mention. In its short existence, the term has come to mean
different things to different people. Boutros-Ghali, thought by many
to have coined the term, defined "peace-enforcement" as an action
performed by member states who volunteered for service and were
on-call to the United Nations. Peace-enforcement forces were to be
more heavily armed and more extensively trained than peacekeeping
forces. According to Boutros-Ghali, "[d]eployment and operation of
such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council
and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the
command of the Secretary-General., 26  Boutros-Ghali's peace-
24. See DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS
CHAPTER VII POWERS, at Chapters 4-6 (1999), on the delegation of U.N. Security
Council powers to member states and regional arrangements.
25. Of course, enforcement as envisaged under Art. 43 of the U.N. Charter was
to have been led by the Security Council. Blokker, supra note 20, at 542.
26. Agenda for Peace, supra note 8, at 44.
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enforcement, however, is different from any forceful peacekeeping
operation ever undertaken by the United Nations in that he
envisaged peace-enforcement forces operating on-call.27
To others, peace-enforcement is a means "to bring about or
ensure compliance with some aspect of a Security Council mandate or
an agreement among the parties."'  "Unlike peacekeeping, but like
full-scale enforcement measures, peace enforcement operations do
not necessarily require the consent of the parties involved, 29 and
peace-enforcement operations may use force beyond self-defense.
According to this view, whether an operation is led by the United
Nations, or by a member state or group of member states, is
irrelevant to its characterization as peace-enforcement: ONUC would
be categorized as peace-enforcement; so would the French-led
Opgration Turquoise in Rwanda in 1994. In effect, the concept is
similar to the term "quasi-enforcement" used herein, except that
"quasi-enforcement" only refers to those operations led by states or
COTWS.
Common to all definitions of "peace-enforcement" is that it
involves a greater use of force than peacekeeping, and a presumption
that peacekeeping features a limited use of force. Because almost all
peacekeeping operations in the last eight years have been given the
authority to use force of a nature which is equal to or greater than the
force used by operations classified as "peace-enforcement," drawing a
distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is no
longer valuable, if indeed it ever was.'
In this discussion I will rely on the terms peacekeeping and
27. Moreover, it is arguable that Boutros-Ghali intended peace-enforcement to
be limited to the enforcement of Art. 40 provisional measures. Jane Boulden takes
this view, though she concedes that this limitation "has long since fallen by the
wayside." JANE BOULDEN, PEACE ENFORCEMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS
EXPERIENCE IN CONGO, SOMALIA, AND BOSNIA 2 (2001). Whether Boutros-Ghali
envisaged such a limitation is debatable; he is not explicit on this point. See Agenda
for Peace, supra note 8, at T 44.
28. BOULDEN, supra note 27, at 3; see also TREVOR FINDLAY, THE USE OF FORCE
IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS (2002).
29. Id. at 3.
30. Even when it was rare for peacekeeping operations to be authorized to use
enforcement-type levels of force, reliance on the term "peace-enforcement" to signal
a more forceful endeavor than peacekeeping was of limited value as it was impossible
to state with precision how much force beyond force in self-defense a peacekeeping
operation must be authorized to use in order for it to transmogrify into "peace-
enforcement." As such, what was classified as "peacekeeping" by one commentator
was frequently classified as "peace-enforcement" by another.
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enforcement and avoid the term peace-enforcement. The term
peacekeeping carries no connotation of a limited use of force;
however, as noted, it necessarily refers to an operation led by the
United Nations. An enforcement operation, on the other hand, is one
which is authorized to use considerable force and is not led by the
United Nations. Where necessary, I specify whether the enforcement
operation referred to is "quasi-enforcement" or "full-blown
enforcement." As such, a peacekeeping operation may be authorized
to use an "enforcement-type" level of force without becoming an
"enforcement" operation.
II. The Cold War
Introduction
As noted, the self-defense principle meant that peacekeepers
could not use force beyond self-defense in a peacekeeping operation.
That peacekeepers possess the right to use force in self-defense has
been assumed for reasons both practical and legal. Practically
speaking, U.N. member states would not be likely to volunteer troops
(and individuals would not likely be willing to serve) in circumstances
where individuals were denuded of a right so essential to their
survival." Legally speaking, the right to self-defense has been
assumed to be inherent.32 Indeed, the right to self-defense exists in all
endeavors national or international.
Because there is no established definition of the concept of self-
defense - in peacekeeping or otherwise - the line between force in
self-defense and force beyond self-defense can be very difficult to
31. As observed by Findlay, "From a political perspective, it has been clear since the
advent of peacekeeping that states are unwilling to provide forces to the UN if they
are not given the right of self-defence." Findlay, supra note 3, at 53.
32. In the words of Dag Hammarskj6ld, in 1958, "It should be generally
recognized that [a right of self-defense for U.N. peacekeepers] exists." The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Summary Study of the
Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force, 179,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/3943 (Oct. 9, 1958) [hereinafter
"Summary Study"]; see also The President of the Security Council, Note [transmitting
statement by the President of the Security Council concerning the item entitled "An
agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping], U.N. Doc.
S/25859 (May 28, 1993) at 1, which refers to the "inherent right of United Nations
forces to take appropriate measures for self-defence." See also Cox, Beyond Self-
Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations & the Use of Force, 27 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 239, 249 (1999).
[Vol. 30:3
The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping
draw. Echoing the difficult considerations as to when states may
legitimately have recourse to force under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter33 (what tends to be referred to as "national self-defense," in
contrast to the "individual self-defense" being considered herein),
issues have arisen regarding the timing of the self-defense. May self-
defense only occur in the face of an attack or is it permissible for
peacekeepers to act in an anticipatory fashion? Moreover, may the
right of self-defense be relied upon only where the use of force is for
the protection of the "self" or can it serve to justify the defense of
others under the protection of the user of force?
Because forces committed to a peacekeeping mission continue to
be bound by their own national law even though they are on foreign
territory, ' one indicator of what level of force may legally constitute
self-defense stems from national laws. However, criminal laws at the
national (or state) level regarding self-defense vary. Each legislature
has its own provisions dealing with matters such as whether force may
be used for protection of persons only or if it extends to property
(and if property, whether it must be a dwelling), the level of force
which may be used, the prerequisites to the use of force and whether
only the individual who (or whose property) is under threat may reply
or whether others may legitimately use force on his or her behalf (and
if so, what relationship with the victim is required).35 As a result, each
33. Art. 51 recognizes states' "inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs."
34. As noted by Dale Stevens, "it is a universal precondition of participating in a
UN peace operation that military discipline remains within the exclusive purview of
the contributing state." Dale Stevens, The Lawful Use of Force by Peacekeeping
Forces: The Tactical Imperative, 12/2 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 157, 160 (2005).
35. For example, the California Penal Code provisions may be contrasted with
those in the Criminal Code of Canada. The California Code provides, inter alia, that
homicide is justified when committed "in defense of habitation, property or person"
against someone who endeavors to commit a violent felony or who intends to enter
the habitation, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, with a violent purpose.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(2) (West 2007). Further, homicide is justified where it is
relied upon (as a last resort) in defense of the actor's own person or "a wife or
husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of such person" where there are
reasonable grounds to believe a sufficiently serious felony is imminent. Id. at §
197(3). The Canadian Code provides, inter alia, that when someone has been
unlawfully assaulted (without provocation), causing death or grievous bodily harm to
the attacker is justified if the person repelling the assault has a reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm from the assault and believes he or
she cannot otherwise preserve him- or herself from the death or grievous bodily
harm. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., § 34 (1985). When it comes to the use of
force to prevent an impending assault, the Canadian Code provides that a person is
justified in "using force to defend himself or any one under his protection from
2007]
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national contingent in a U.N. peacekeeping operation has its own
Rules of Engagement ("ROE") regarding the use of force. 6
The focus of this discussion, however, is the use of force by
peacekeepers authorized under the U.N. system. Several factors are
relevant. The U.N. Security Council is the obvious source for
determining the meaning of self-defense in a peacekeeping operation.
Because the Security Council rarely provides much elaboration on
this point, we must look for clues in the actions of the Secretary-
General who, along with the DPKO and the force commanders,
establishes the U.N. ROE for each mission. While parameters for the
legitimate use of self-defense imposed at the national level may have
considerable influence either as evidence of custom or general
principles of international law,37 the United Nations' approach may
well be different in nature - perhaps even contradicting the rules
governing the use of self-defense in the peacekeeping operation as
determined by the national legislation.38 In the words of one
commentator: "The self-defense principle, the bedrock of
peacekeeping, is apparently infinitely malleable. It therefore needs
careful definition and management.,
39
assault, if he uses no more force than is necessary to prevent the assault or the
repetition of it." As to defense of property, the Canadian Code provides that
someone who is in possession of personal property "and every one lawfully assisting
him" is justified in preventing a trespasser from taking it "if he does not strike or
cause bodily harm to the trespasser." Id. at § 38. However, where the trespasser
engages in assault the level of force deemed permissible increased. Further, if the
property in question is a dwelling house, "Every one who is in peaceable possession
of a dwelling-house, and every one lawfully assisting him or acting under his
authority, is justified in using as much force as is necessary to prevent any person
from forcibly breaking into or forcibly entering the dwelling-house without lawful
authority." Id. at § 40.
36. Stevens, supra note 34, at 160. As Stevens observes, "The national military
forces that participate in UN peace operations and comprise the peacekeeping force
will invariably operate within a complex legal environment characterized by
ambiguities, 'fuzziness' and even contradiction.... [T]here is an intractable tension
between international law and the domestic law that invariably follows national troop
contingents." Id. at 157-158.
37. For example, Stevens observes that "UN ROE generally reflect the position
taken by some nations that force, up to and including deadly force, may be employed
to defend the mission's 'essential property' whose loss could seriously jeopardize the
security of the force or that of the general population." Id. at 165.
38. Stevens observes that while UN ROE generally allow the use of lethal force
to protect "essential property," national criminal laws may not. Id. at 165.
39. FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 85.
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A. The Self-Defense Principle Elaborated: The Early Years
Not until after the establishment of the First United Nations
Emergency Force ("UNEF I") in 1956 did the rules relating to the use
of force by U.N. peacekeepers begin to develop in a significant way.40
In a 1958 Summary Study on the experience derived from UNEF I,
Hammarskj6ld noted that peacekeeping forces could "never include
combat activity.""1  He recognized, nonetheless, that "[t]here will
always remain, of course, a certain margin of freedom for judgment,
as, for example, on the extent and nature of the arming of the units
and of their right of self-defence. '4 2 He further observed:
A reasonable definition [of when force may be used in self-defense]
seems to have been established in the case of [UNEF I], where the
rule is applied that men engaged in the operation may never take
the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond
with force to an attack with arms, including attempts to use force to
make them withdraw from positions which they occupy under
orders from the Commander, acting under the authority of the
Assembly and within the scope of its resolutions. The basic
element involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative in
the use of armed force. This definition of the limit between self-
defence, as permissible for United Nations elements of the kind
discussed, and offensive actions, which is beyond the competence of
such elements, should be approved for future guidance.43
In Hammarskj6ld's view, while it should be generally recognized
that a right to self-defense for peacekeeping missions exists "it should
be exercised only under strictly defined conditions," because "a wide
interpretation of the right of self-defence might well blur the
distinction between [peacekeeping] operations and combat
operations, which would require a decision under Chapter VII of the
Charter and an explicit, more far-reaching delegation of authority to
the Secretary-General." 44
40. LIu, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that, given the limited size of some of the
early missions, "they would not be able to [use force] even if they wanted to"). See
also Ray Murphy, United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use
of Force, 8/1 J. CONFLICr & SECURITY L. 71, 72 (2003). According to Findlay, the
practice emerged from this operation "gradually and in an ad hoc fashion and was
only later codified." Findlay, supra note 3, at 53.
41. Summary Study, supra note 32, at 178.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
44. Id.
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Hammarskjold strikes a careful balance between an overly literal
conception of self-defense - one limiting the use of force to the
protection of one's own person - and an overly broad conception
which would stray into enforcement-type action (what he termed
"offensive" or "combat" actions). While the Secretary-General
recognized a "margin of freedom" in relation to the right of self-
defense, he imposed clear limits: a peacekeeping mission 1) must not
initiate the use of armed force and 2) must only use force in response
to an attack with arms, including attempts to make peacekeepers
withdraw from their positions.
A conception of self-defense whereby one is permitted to use
reasonable violence only in reaction to violence, but which gives the
defender a certain amount of discretion to act to defend more than
just herself, appears sound. Such a conception of self-defense
comports with the national criminal law of some states45 as well as the
law of the International Criminal Court. ' If the concept were limited
strictly to the defense of the "self" of the peacekeeper subjected to
violence, peacekeepers would be required to stand by in the face of
an attack on one of their fellow peacekeepers. Moreover, if the "self"
did not extend to the territory on which the peacekeepers operate,
they would be required to retreat when the territory they occupy was
overrun by armed spoilers. Such a position is clearly untenable.
B. The Self-Defense Principle Ignored: ONUC
Hammarskjold's recognition of the need for a limitation on the
use of force in self-defense, lest the distinction between peacekeeping
missions and enforcement become blurred, was prescient. Only a few
years after he propounded the above test, the United Nations moved
45. See discussion supra note 35.
46. Under Art. 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal
Court, which entered into force July 1, 2002, criminal responsibility is excluded if at
the time of the conduct, "The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or
another person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the
survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for
accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a
manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or
property protected." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (Jul. 17, 1998), available at
<www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm>; but see Antonio Cassese, The Statute of
the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10(1) EUR. J. INT'L
L. 144, 154 (1999), observing, "The notion of self-defence as a ground for excusing
criminal responsibility laid down in this provision seems to be excessively broad and
at variance with existing international criminal law."
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away from it. The U.N. mission in the newly independent Congo,
known by its French acronym ONUC, tested the limits of any
emerging definition of peacekeeping as well as the very foundations
of the United Nations itself.47 During this mission - referred to by
one commentator as the United Nations' Vietnam48 - the concept of
self-defense became ever more broad until it appeared to be
abandoned altogether, for the purposes of ONUC at least.
In early July 1960, in the aftermath of the Belgian Congo's hasty
transition to independence, there were attacks against many of the
Belgian nationals remaining there. Belgium responded by sending in
troops against the wishes of the Congolese central government. The
United Nations responded by calling for the immediate withdrawal of
Belgian forces and by authorizing technical and military assistance. ' 9
However, as the situation in the country deteriorated, the Security
Council authorized progressively more forceful measures. Following
a constitutional crisis in September 1960, the U.N. General
Assembly0 called on the Secretary-General to continue to "take
vigorous action in line with the Security Council's resolutions" and to
"assist the Central Government ... in the restoration and
maintenance of law and order throughout the territory.., and to
safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in
the interests of international peace and security."51 On February 21,
1961, in the aftermath of the murder of the Congolese Prime Minister
and the resulting increase in violence, the Security Council authorized
ONUC to take "all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of
civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the
halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the
use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. 5 2  Following
47. See generally, G. ABI-SAAB, THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE
CONGO 1960-1964 (1978); TREVOR FINDLAY, THE BLUE HELMETS' FIRST WAR? USE
OF FORCE BY THE UN IN THE CONGO 1960-1964 (1999).
48. WILLIAM J. DURCH ED., THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: CASE
STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 31 (1993).
49. S.C. Res. 143, U.N. Doc. S/4387 (Jul. 14, 1960).
50. "The force.., had become mired in a dispute between the West and the
Soviet Union. By September, Moscow began to demand the operation's termination.
On September 17, the U.S. invoked 'Uniting for Peace' to convene another
emergency session of the General Assembly." FRANCK, supra note 20, at 37.
51. G.A. Res. 1474 U.N. Doc. A/1474 (Sept. 20, 1960).
52. S.C. Res. 161, T 1, U.N. Doc. S/4741 (Feb. 21, 1961) (emphasis added). The
resolution also called for the immediate "withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign
military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United
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Hammarskj6ld's death in September 1961,"3 "the ground shifted
somewhat."'  The Security Council authorized ONUC to "take
vigorous action, including the requisite measure of force, if necessary,
for the immediate apprehension, detention.., or deportation of all
foreign military and paramilitary personnel ... and mercenaries.
5
1
The mission reached its apex as U.N. forces began to seize control of
positions to ensure that they had free movement, and to use force to
ensure the removal of mercenaries. 6
At the start of the mission, Hammarskj6ld steadfastly maintained
that the rules relating to the use of force had not changed and that the
mission 1) must never initiate the use of armed force, and 2) must only
use force in response to an armed attack, including an attempt to
make them withdraw from legitimately held positions. 7 However,
Hammarskj6ld eventually wrote of an expanded concept of self-
defense in the Congo to include a response to "attempts to overrun or
displace U.N. positions," '58 and the "disarming and, if necessary, the
detention of those preparing to attack U.N. troops."59 His position
evolved to a point where he authorized pre-emptive action against
conduct considered to be "[i]ncitement to or preparation for violence,
including troop movements and confirmed reports of an impending
Nations Command, and mercenaries." Id.
53. On September 17, 1961, on a trip to Northern Rhodesia in support of
resolving the situation in the Congo, the Secretary-General's flight crashed and he
was killed.
54. 3 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY, AFRICA 47 (1980) [hereinafter "HIGGINS,
AFRICA"]. The death of several Italian peacekeepers in November 1961 in a separate
incident also increased the tension surrounding the mission. Id. at 354-356.
55. S.C. Res. 169, 4, U.N. Doc. S/5002 (Nov. 24, 1961).
56. See UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING 215-257 (1st ed. 1985). See also HIGGINS, AFRICA, supra note 54, at
356.
57. See the comments of the Secretary-General in First Report of the Secretary-
General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution. S.C. Res. 143, 15,
U.N. Doc. S/4387 (Jul. 14, 1960), reproduced in ROBERT C. R. SIEKMANN, BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED PEACE-KEEPING FORCES 77 (1984).
Moreover, S.C. Res. 161, supra note 152, was "deemed by Hammarskjold ... to give
no additional rights to use force." See HIGGINS, AFRICA, supra note 54, at 47. See
also the Secretary-General's letter to contributing states after S.C. Res. 161, Annex
VII, U.N. Doc. S/4752 (Feb. 27 1961), reproduced in part in HIGGINS, AFRICA, supra
note 54, at 51.
58. HIGGINS, AFRICA, supra note 54, at 51-52.
59. Id.
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attack, would warrant protective action by U.N. troops. ' 6°
Hammarskj6ld considered that the mandate of February 21, 1961
authorized ONUC to "arrest anyone actually leading a mob
demonstration. ,61
The ONUC mission shows Hammarskjold's "margin of freedom"
stretched beyond its breaking point. Indeed, based on the level of
force authorized, many have concluded that ONUC was not a
peacekeeping operation.6 Whereas Hammarskj old and others in the
context of UNEF I interpreted the meaning of the term "self-
defense" to include defense of a position - a valid and necessary
interpretation of the term - the use of force in ONUC clearly went
much further.
In conclusion, the use of force in ONUC surpassed any realistic
definition of self-defense. ONUC was a peacekeeping operation with
powers that were similar in nature to those which might be bestowed
on an enforcement operation. While few commentators went so far
as to classify the operation as enforcement, there was certainly no
denying that the type of force authorized meant that the self-defense
principle was abandoned at least in this case.63 Nevertheless many,
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. Nevertheless, HammarskjOld remained a voice of moderation compared
to some. He was determined to emphasize the distinction between the use of force
he felt strictly necessary and the all out waging of war by the peacekeepers against
separatist Katanga. Indeed, Hammarskj6ld's vision of the appropriate level of force
was not uniformly adhered to by his commanders on the ground. HIGGINS, AFRICA,
supra note 54, at 395.
62. See, e.g., Findlay who describes ONUC as "a mission that would... take
peacekeepers beyond peacekeeping into peace enforcement." He notes that the
controversies relating to ONUC's mandate, including its use of force, "set back the
search for a sensible and practicable use-of-force doctrine for the UN." FINDLAY,
supra note 28, at 51. MAnsson refers to ONUC as "de facto peace enforcement."
Katarina MAnsson, Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the
Congo, 12/4 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 503,504 (Winter 2005).
63. As Bowett observed, "it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Security
Council by [adopting S.C. Res. 161] abandoned a strict reliance on the principle of
self-defence"; he noted further that S.C. Res. 169, supra note 55, "too, marked an
abandonment of the self-defence limitation." BOWETT, supra note 21, at 202. The
issue of whether the operation constituted an "enforcement action" is a separate one
from whether it went beyond force in self-defense. For Bowett, as well as most of the
commentators of the day, the operation did not constitute enforcement. Id. at 176.
Of course, the debate in this area is somewhat foreclosed by the fact that the
International Court of Justice ruled that ONUC was not enforcement. Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, U.N. Charter art. 17, para. 2, Advisory Opinion of 20
July 1962, Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders (International
Court of Justice: The Hague, 1962), 150; but cf. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note
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including the United Nations itself," have taken the view that ONUC
comported with the self-defense principle. In order to take this
position, one needs to fit the type of activity undertaken by ONUC -
the use of force against those inciting violence, the use of force to
expel mercenaries, the use of force to detain those preparing to attack
U.N. troops and the use force in advance of an armed attack65 -
66within one's definition of self-defense. This view is misleading as it
ignores the normal meaning of the term "self-defense" - even where
defined expansively.67 It strains credulity6 to argue that the level of
force authorized for ONUC was in the nature of self-defense.
Professor Nigel White described an interpretation that ONUC was
acting in self-defense as being "unacceptably wide... going far
beyond that authorized for other peacekeeping operations." 69
22, at 53, where they observe that "despite the judgment of the world court in the
Expenses case, [ONUC] amounted to de facto enforcement action."
64. The United Nations, which categorizes ONUC as peacekeeping, continued to
assert the existence of the self-defense principle even after ONUC. See Schachter,
supra note 3, at 84, who notes the United Nations' reluctance to acknowledge that
the nature of the force used in ONUC could not realistically be considered to be self-
defense.
65. According to Bowett, ONUC's "operations in September and December
1961 were in the nature of 'anticipatory' measures of self-defence rather than
reactions to an actual armed attack." BOWETr, supra note 21, at 202.
66. In the words of Adam Roberts, "some military actions [in the Congo] were
dressed up as self-defence when in fact they were essentially proactive." Adam
Roberts, From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force, 37/4
SURVIVAL 7, 15 (Winter 1995-1996); see also Findlay who describes ONUC as "a
mission that would break all the rules established so far [in relation to the use of
force], although not avowedly so" (emphasis added). FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 51.
67. As noted by Bowett, ONUC "placed considerable strain on the concept of
self-defence." BOWETr, supra note 21, at 213. He continued, "The use of force to
protect the civilian population was scarcely self-defence and the Secretary-General
was obliged to describe it as 'on the outer margin of the mandate of the United
Nations."' Id. at 201 (quoting a statement by the Secretary-General to the Security
Council of February 15, 1961 (Official Record of the Security Council, 91 27, 16th yr.,
935th Mtg.)).
68. One former U.N. official speaks of the tendency of the United Nations to
stretch the meaning of self-defense "to incredulity and beyond its usual legal
meaning." Schachter, supra note 3, at 84.
69. NIGEL D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 201 (1990). See also CHRISTINE GRAY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 203 (2d ed. 2004)[hereinafter "GRAY,
2d ed."] where she notes that the Security Council "authorized ONUC to use force
going beyond self-defence."
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C. Self-Defense Expanded: Defense of Mandate
ONUC was the high-water mark regarding the use of force in a
peacekeeping mission during the Cold War. The strict limitations on
the use of self-defense established in UNEF I and championed by
Hammarskjold (that a peacekeeping operation should never initiate
the use of armed force and could only use it in response to an armed
attack, including an attempt to force withdrawal) were not to revive
after being surpassed with the ONUC. Instead, the "defense of
mandate" approach emerged whereby the right to use "self-defense"
in a mission was expanded to include the situation where the mandate
of the mission was interfered with. While the invocation of "self-
defense" language sounds as though the use of force would occur only
rarely and in prescribed circumstances, with this approach, as we shall
see, peacekeeping operations were given authority to use force which
was in many ways more akin to enforcement than to self-defense.
As the mission in the Congo was winding down in early 1964, the
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was just
getting under way.7' At the insistence of troop-contributing states,7
then Secretary-General U Thant provided the following explanation
of self-defense for the mission:
The expression self-defence includes the defence of the United
Nations posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as
support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack.
When acting in self-defence the principle of minimum force shall
always be applied and armed force will only be used when all
means of persuasion have failed. The decision as to when force is
to be used rests with the Commander on the spot. Examples in
which troops may be authorized to use force include attempts by
force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they
occupy under orders from their commanders, attempts by force to
disarm them, and attempts by force to prevent them from carrying
72out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.
Thant's approach to self-defense - informed, presumably, by
the mission in the Congo which had proven so costly in peacekeepers'
70. S.C. Res. 186, U.N. Doc. S/5575 (Mar. 4, 1964).
71. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution, in
PEACEKEEPING WITH MUSCLE: THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 17, 19 (Alex Morrison, Douglas A. Fraser & James D. Kiras eds., 1997).
72. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of
U.N. Forces in Cyprus, at 7(c), U.N. Doc. S/5960 (Sept. 10, 1964).
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lives73 - is considerably broader than that set out by Hammarskjold
in relation to UNEF I. The concept of self-defense was clarified;
force could be used to protect one's fellow peacekeepers and the
premises of the mission in the face of armed attack. Significantly, the
concept of self-defense was expanded to allow peacekeepers to
counter attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their
responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.
The idea that force to prevent forceful interference with a
commander's orders could be considered self-defense was expanded
with the establishment of the Second United Nations Emergency
Force ("UNEF II") in 1973. Self-defense could now be used to
prevent forceful interference with all duties under the mandate.
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in his report to the Security
Council74 spoke of a force that "shall not use force except in self-
defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by
forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the
mandate of the Security Council.,
75
In a resolution of the same day, the Security Council approved
this report.76 According to the DPKO, a similar approach, whereby
self-defense includes defense of the mandate, has been stipulated for
each peacekeeping force since 1973. 77  Waldheim used similar
language in his report calling for the establishment of the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon ("UNIFIL") in 1978.8 In addition
to adopting Waldheim's report - and thereby his inclusion of the
73. According to Findlay, "One hundred and twenty-seven UN military
personnel died in action and 133 were wounded, along with scores of European
expatriates and hundreds of Congolese." FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 81-82.
74. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 340, U.N. Doc. S/11052/REV.1 (Oct.
27, 1973) (approved by S.C. Res. 341, U.N. Doc. S/RES/341 (Oct. 27, 1973)).
75. Id., at I 4(d).
76. S.C. Res. 341, supra note 72.
77. See UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS,
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 35, U.N. Doc.
210/TC/GG95 (Oct. 1995), available at <www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/
tes-publications/books/peacekeeping-training/genguide-en>.
78. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425, 4(d), U.N. Doc. S/12611 (Mar.
19, 1978) ("The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It
shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to
attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the
mandate of the Security Council. The Force will proceed on the assumption that the
parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the
decisions of the Security Council").
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defense of mandate within the concept of self-defense - the Security
Council went one step further. 9 With UNIFIL, for the first times° the
Security Council (rather than the Secretary-General) specifically
provided in a resolution that "self-defence would include resistance to
attempts by forceful means to prevent it discharging its duties under
the mandate of the Security Council."'" Thus the "defense of
mandate" approach to self-defense became even more firmly
entrenched.
The United Nations' approach to authorizing the use of force by
peacekeeping missions after ONUC was more measured, with an
emphasis on the self-defense principle both in Security Council
resolutions and the reports of the Secretary-General endorsed by the
Security Council. If taken literally, however, the defense of mandate
approach to self-defense could lead to operations that were no less
forceful than ONUC - particularly where the Security Council
mandate was general in nature, as was frequently the case. For
example, the Security Council mandated UNEF II to supervise its
demand that the cease-fire be observed and to prevent a recurrence
of the fighting;82 similarly, it mandated UNFICYP to "use its best
efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to
contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a
return to normal conditions." 83  Under the defense of mandate
approach, any forceful action that would serve to achieve these very
broad goals could be classed as self-defense, including, presumably,
forceful disarmament or attacking any faction whose conduct is
79. S.C. Res. 425, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (Mar. 19, 1978); S.C. Res. 426, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/426 (Mar. 19, 1978).
80. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 203 (2000),
at 179 [hereinafter "GRAY, 1st ed."].
81. S.C. Res. 425, supra note 79. Gray notes that the express provision that force
may only be used in self-defense in this mission led to the concern that there might
arise "the false inference that if a resolution did not expressly authorize the right of
self-defence a peacekeeping force could not legally use force in self-defence." She
suggested that this concern may be responsible for the fact that in later resolutions
(in relation to missions in Rwanda and Angola) the Security Council recognized the
right of peacekeeping operations to use force instead of authorizing it. GRAY, 1st ed.,
supra note 80, at 179.
82. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 340, 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/11052/REV.1
(Oct. 27, 1973), as endorsed by S.C. Res. 341, supra note 72. The mandate is
described by Murphy as "ambiguous and unrealistic from the beginning." Murphy,
supra note 40, at 83.
83. S.C. Res. 186, supra note 70, T 5.
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judged likely to reignite the conflict. In the words of White:
"Allowing a force to take positive action in defence of its purposes is
no different from allowing it to enforce them."" Professor Ray
Murphy made a similar point when he observed that the defense of
mandate approach has "allowed the Security Council to give almost
any task, however ill thought out or unrealistic, to a peacekeeping
force, in the expectation that it could use force under the guise of self-
defence and still retain its peacekeeping status."85
Peacekeeping missions during this period did not, in fact, take
advantage of this possibility to use virtually unlimited force." This
restraint may be attributable to the commanders in the field, perhaps
influenced by their understanding of the difficulties that might have
resulted if they had, as had so vividly been illustrated with ONUC.'
In the words of one observer: "While theoretically the concept of self-
defense was broadened, in practice the expanded doctrine has
remained, at least until more recent times, largely unused. '' 8 I will
consider these more recent, post-Cold War times below.
In conclusion, the very sensible parameters Hammarskj6ld
outlined for the use of force in U.N. peacekeeping were short-lived.
A few years after they were set out, they were all but abandoned in
ONUC. In the words of one commentator, the controversies relating
to ONUC's mandate, including its use of force, "set back the search
for a sensible and practicable use-of-force doctrine for the U.N."89
Although the Security Council's decision to explicitly bestow
enforcement powers on ONUC was not to be repeated with any other
peacekeeping operation during the Cold War, the acceptance of the
defense of mandate approach to self-defense could have had much
84. See WHITE, supra note 69, at 201.
85. See Murphy, supra note 40, at 72.
86. Roberts observes, "This formulation... did not in practice lead to a general
pattern of more forceful response when UN forces were hampered by armed groups
from performing their duties; nor did it lead to a general pattern of [increased] troop
deployments and armament levels." Roberts, supra note 66, at 14.
87. Murphy notes that, "the guidelines of the Secretary-General relating to the
use of force were to be restrictively interpreted and applied." Murphy, supra note 40,
at 83. He gives the example of UNIFIL refraining to use force to deploy in the area
controlled by the PLO, despite this being permitted by the guidelines.
"[I]nvolvement [in functions and duties related to the maintenance of internal law
and order] could have had serious repercussions on the impartiality of the force by
involving it in the internal conflict taking place alongside the international crisis
caused by the Israeli invasion." Id. at 84.
88. See Cox, supra note 32, at 256.
89. FINDLAY,supra note 28, at 51.
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the same effect.
We have therefore seen that even during the Cold War the
Security Council's adherence to the self-defense principle in
peacekeeping was neither strict nor unconditional. Nevertheless,
commentators and the United Nations itself were content to maintain
the artifice that the self-defense principle in peacekeeping existed -
even in the face of facts to the contrary. This may not have been
without purpose. If the faqade of the self-defense principle could be
adhered to, potential host states and contributing states would have
the impression that peacekeeping was a non-violent endeavor,
thereby making consent much easier to obtain. As noted by
Urquhart, "[i]t is [its non-violent nature] that makes peacekeeping
forces acceptable both to the governments and parties engaged in
conflict, and to the governments that contribute the troops. '
H. Peacekeeping and Force
in the Aftermath of the Cold War
Introduction
From the establishment of UNIFIL in 1978 until the
establishment of the United Nations Good Offices Mission in
Afghanistan and Pakistan ("UNGOMAP") in 1988, no new
peacekeeping operations became operational. However, that
changed after Boutros-Ghali became Secretary-General in January
1992.91 In the years immediately preceding Boutros-Ghali's
appointment, two events occurred which significantly impacted U.N.
peacekeeping.' The first was the end of the Cold War in the late
1980s. Second, and related, was the success of Operation Dessert
Storm, a "full-blown" enforcement operation established by a newly
cooperative Security Council. In the aftermath of these events, with
the attendant expectations that under the "new world order" the
Security Council could finally exercise its enforcement function
without fear of the exercise of the veto on ideological grounds, came
90. Urquhart in LIU, supra note 1, at 7.
91. "A new era of activity began as the Cold War ended with more
[peacekeeping operations] begun by the UN during the next five years than in all of
the previous forty." DENNIS C. JETT, WHY PEACEKEEPING FAILS 27 (1999).
92. A third event may have also had an impact: In 1988 the United Nations was
awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for its peacekeeping activities.
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"what was perhaps the apogee of expectations for peacekeeping.""
On the heels of these events, the Security Council requested that
Boutros-Ghali set forth his ideas on ways to strengthen and make
more efficient peacekeeping and related activities. 9 The report which
emerged, entitled An Agenda for Peace,95 showed the new Secretary-
General's willingness to engage in fresh thinking on peacekeeping
operations, including a willingness to challenge the traditional
limitation on the use of force therein. However, as we shall see, he
did not appear to pay due regard to the difficulties that emerge when
peacekeeping and force are mixed, as the Congo mission so well
illustrated.96
A. The Self-Defense Principle Suspended- An Agenda for Peace
In An Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali attempted to clarify the
concept of peacekeeping by distinguishing it from various, related
concepts: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building.
Boutros-Ghali considered preventive diplomacy as a means of
avoiding a crisis, post-conflict peace building as a means "to prevent a
recurrence' 97 of the crisis and peacemaking (including, where
necessary, peace-enforcement), and peacekeeping as methods to
bring hostile parties to agreement after a crisis developed. 9 As noted
above,99 for Boutros-Ghali peace-enforcement - a sub-category of
peacemaking"° - would consist of heavily armed military units
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII and under the
command of the Secretary-General.'' Significantly, the report
provided a revised definition of peacekeeping:
Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in
93. JETT, supra note 91, at 3.
94. The President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security
Council, 3, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (May 31, 1992).
95. Agenda for Peace, supra note 8.
96. Brian Urquhart describes ONUC as "a kind of rehearsal" for operations such
as those in Bosnia or Somalia. Interview by Harry Keisler with Brian Urquhart, at
the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, A Life in
Peace and War: Conversation with Sir Brian Urquhart, (Mar. 19, 1996), available at
<globetrotter.berkeley.edu/UN/Urquhart/urquhart6.html>.
97. Agenda for Peace, supra note 8, 57.
98. "When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and
peace-keeping come into play." Id. at 21.
99. See discussion supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
100. Agenda for Peace, supra note 8, at 44-45.
101. Id. at j 44.
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the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned,
normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel
and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the
making of peace.102
Although neither this definition nor the balance of the report
addresses the question of when force is appropriate in a peacekeeping
mission, the definition impacts the question in two important ways.' °3
First, the insertion into the definition of the word "hitherto" before
the words "with the consent of all the parties concerned" - carrying
with it the clear implication that consent was no longer an essential
part of peacekeeping - signaled a departure from accepted practice.
This is significant because only where a peacekeeping operation is
established as a mandatory measure under Chapter VII, may it legally
be put in place without the consent of the state where the operation is
to be stationed.' Moreover, the need for consent has traditionally
operated as a check on the use of force; states are less likely to
consent to a peacekeeping operation where offensive force is
authorized."' A second, related impact stemmed from the fact that
the report - and this is highlighted in the last sentence of above
definition with its reference to peacekeeping's role in the "making" of
peace - left tremendous scope for overlap between peacekeeping
102. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
103. For a helpful discussion of the impact of An Agenda for Peace on the use of
force in peacekeeping, see, generally, Rosalyn Higgins, Peace and Security:
Achievements and Failures, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 445 (1995)
104. This point was made in 1956 by Hammarskjrld. He observed that the
General Assembly "could not request [UNEF I] to be stationed on the territory of a
given country without the consent of the government of that country. This does not
exclude the possibility that the Security Council could use such a force within the
wider margins provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter." While
the point was made in the context of an operation established by the General
Assembly, it would apply equally to an operation established by the Security Council
unless the Security Council was acting in a binding manner under Ch. VII. The
Secretary-General, Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan for
an Emergency International U.N. Force Requested in Resolution 998 (ES-1), 9, U.N.
Doc. A/3302 (Nov. 6, 1956) (adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 4, 1956);
G.A. Res. 1001 (Nov. 7, 1956). Boutros-Ghali described peace-enforcement as going
"beyond peacekeeping to the extent that the operation would be deployed without
the express consent of the two parties" while retaining "many of the features of
peacekeeping." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71
FOREIGN AFF. 89, 94 (1991-1993).
105. See supra note 5 and corresponding text for a discussion of the
interconnectedness of the two concepts; see also supra note 90 and corresponding text
regarding states' attitudes towards forceful peacekeeping.
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and peacemaking, including peace-enforcement."' 6
1. Overview of the Operations
During Boutros-Ghali's five-year term from January 1992 to
December 1996, discord in various parts of the world provided a
laboratory for the testing of his ideas. I will focus on four missions
which illustrate the difficulties associated with increasing the
forcefulness of peacekeeping missions: the missions in Rwanda,
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti."7 In each case the United
Nations was unable to carry out peacekeeping functions due to
violent conditions on the ground. In each case the Security Council
responded in two ways. First, it put in place a COTW-led "quasi-
enforcement" action, either operating concurrently with the
peacekeeping operation or temporarily taking over for the
peacekeeping operation with a view to restoring peace and security so
that the peacekeeping operation might return. Second, the Security
Council increased the peacekeeping operation's authorization to use
force. As a result, during this period peacekeeping and enforcement
overlapped to the point that, at times, the distinction between them
became virtually imperceptible.'" As we shall see, these missions
proved to be extremely problematic and in some cases seriously
damaged the reputation of the United Nations.
a. Former Yugoslavia (February 1992 - December 2002)"°
By late 1991, matters in the former Yugoslavia had begun to
deteriorate rapidly. As a result of fighting in Croatia and Slovenia,
the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia
("UNPROFOR") was established in February 1992 "to create the
conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an
overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."1 Despite his concerns that
conditions for peacekeeping did not actually exist,"' the Secretary-
106. The Secretary-General indicated that he considered peace-enforcement to
occur at the same stage of conflict as peacekeeping. See Agenda for Peace, supra
note 8, at 57.
107. Other U.N. missions established during this period are not considered in
detail here as they reveal no new lessons.
108. See Higgins, supra note 103, at 450.
109. See FINDLAY, supra note 28, at ch. 7, for a detailed discussion of this
complicated mission and its off-shoots.
110. S.C. Res. 743, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (Feb. 21, 1993).
111. The Secretary-General concluded that "the danger that a U.N. peacekeeping
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General advised the Security Council that the "normal rules in
United Nations peace-keeping operations for the bearing and use of
arms" should apply."2  This would, presumably, include an
understanding that force only be used in self-defense or in defense of
the mandate."3 It was not long into the mission's tenure, however,
before the Security Council made the mission more forceful.
There is considerable scope for disagreement on the question of
when the mission was militarized. In the view of Boutros-Ghali, a
"mission creep" began with Security Council resolution 752 of 15 May
1992, some three months after the establishment of the mission.'14 He
characterizes that resolution as demanding that all irregular forces be
disbanded and disarmed."5 Others see Security Council resolution
776 of September 14, 1992, which authorized the enlargement of
UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as a turning
point.16 Or, the turning point may have come with the Security
Council's resolution 807"7 where, for the first time in its history, the
Security Council explicitly invoked Chapter VII in a peacekeeping
mandate. The resolution called for the "unimpeded freedom of
movement" of UNPROFOR in order for it to carry out its
functions."8
What is clear, however, is that by June 1993... when the Security
Council increased the scope and forcefulness of UNPROFOR's
mandate such that it was charged with deterring acts against the
Security Council's "safe areas,""'2 the nature of the mission had
become more militarized than any previous peacekeeping mission
operation will fail because of lack of cooperation from the parties is less grievous
than the danger that delay in its dispatch will lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire
and to a new conflagration in Yugoslavia." The Secretary-General, Further Report of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721, 9 28, U.N. Doc.
S/23592 (Feb. 15, 1992).
112. Id. at 6.
113. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, at 344
(Manchester U. Press, ed., Juris Publishing 2000) (1993).
114. BOUTROs BOUTROS-GHALI, UNVANQUISHED: A U.S.-U.N. SAGA 40 (1999).
115. Id.
116. See GRAY, 1st ed., supra note 80, at 166.
117. S.C. Res. 807 U.N. Doc. S/RES/807 (Feb. 19, 1993).
118. Id.
119. S.C. Res. 836, 91 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (Jun. 4, 1993).
120. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, established "safe areas" in
April and May 1993. S.C. Res. 819 U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993); see also
S.C. Res. 824 U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (May 6, 1993).
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since ONUC. Under its revised mandate, UNPROFOR was
authorized "acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures,
including the use of force in reply to bombardments against the safe
areas."' 21 In almost all resolutions subsequent to resolution 807,
Chapter VII was specifically invoked. 122 By June 1995, the operation
arguably reached the height of its forcefulness when the Security
Council assigned it a heavily armed Rapid Reaction Force ("RRF")
to enable UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate.'
23
Making an assessment of UNPROFOR's forcefulness even more
complicated was the fact that the Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII, authorized'24  a NATO-led quasi-enforcement
operation 12 to intervene militarily concurrently with UNPROFOR.
Although the NATO operation was separate from UNPROFOR,
because it was working hand-in-glove with UNPROFOR (including
the use of a "dual key" approach whereby UNPROFOR was meant
to authorize the quasi-enforcement operation's use of force) the
quasi-enforcement operation's forcefulness and that of UNPROFOR
became intermingled. 26 A final factor which must be borne in mind
when considering the forcefulness of UNPROFOR is the fact that its
use of force was influenced not just by its changing mandates, but also
by the various approaches of different force commanders and
contingent commanders. '27
After Croatia demanded the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from
its territory in early 1995, the Security Council established the United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia ("UNCRO")
to take over for UNPROFOR there.'28 In early 1996, UNCRO was
replaced by two missions: the United Nations Transitional
121. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 119, 9.
122. Gray, 2d ed., supra note 69, at 219. Gray notes, "as France acknowledged, not
to have resorted to Chapter VII in later resolutions would have been the worst of
signals for the parties." Id.
123. S.C. Res. 998, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/998 (Jun. 16, 1995). As Gray notes,
"states were divided as to whether [the RRF] was really a continuation of
UNPROFOR or a new enforcement force." GRAY, 2d ed., supra note 69, at 219.
124. S.C. Res. 781 U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (Oct. 9, 1992); see also S.C. Res. 816, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/816 (Mar. 31, 1993).
125. Known as "Operation Sky Monitor" and, later, "Operation Deny Flight."
126. At least this was the impression given to those on the ground. For a
discussion of the relationship between the two forces, see GRAY, 2d ed., supra note
69, at 224-226.
127. See FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 219-227.
128. S.C. Res. 981, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/981 (Mar. 31, 1995)
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Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
("UNTAES") 129 and the United Nations Mission of Observers in
Prevlaka ("UNMOP").13 ° The Security Council explicitly invoked
Chapter VII in its resolutions establishing UNCRO and UNTAES
mandates; however, in each case the mandated tasks were not
forceful in nature."' Also in March 1995, the United Nations
Preventive Deployment Force ("UNPREDEP") was established to
replace UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.132 In late 1995, after the Dayton Peace Agreement33
came into effect in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR ceased to
exist entirely and the International Police Task Force ("IPTF"),
which came to be known as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina ("UNMIBH"), was established there."
The United Nations' activities in the former Yugoslavia proved
in many ways to be a disaster. While the fighting in Bosnia ultimately
ceased in late 1995 after nearly four years and hundreds of thousands
129. S.C. Res. 1037, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037 (Jan. 15, 1996). When UNTAES
was wound up in January 1998, its policing functions were taken over by the United
Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG) which ran until October 1998.
130. S.C. Res. 1038, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1038 (Jan. 15, 1996). UNMOP was
terminated in December 2002.
131. The mandate of UNCRO was set out in S.C. Res. 981, supra note 128, 3. It
endorsed the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
947 (1994). U.N. Doc. S/1995/222 (Mar. 3, 1995); Corr.1 U.N. Doc.
S/1995/222/CORR.1 (Mar. 29, 1995). The mandate included matters such as
facilitating previous Security Council resolutions, facilitating delivery of
humanitarian aid, monitoring and reporting, and performing the functions envisaged
in the cease-fire agreement of March 29, 1994. See The Secretary-General, Annex to
Letter Dated 30 March 1994 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of
the Security Council, 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/1994/367 (Mar. 30, 1994). The mandate of
UNTAES set out in S.C. Res. 1037, supra note 129, 10-11, was also non-military in
nature consisting of functions such as monitoring, supervising, and facilitating and
contributing "by its presence to the maintenance of peace and security of the region."
Id. at 10. Although the mandates of UNCRO and UNTAES were established
under Ch. VII, based on the nature of their functions, it appears that this invocation
of Ch. VII was directed at the authorization, in the same resolutions, for member
states (in this case through NATO) to provide close air support to the missions rather
than to facilitate the functioning of the peacekeeping missions.
132. S.C. Res. 983 U.N. Doc. S/RES/983 (Mar. 31, 1995).
133. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the
Secretary-General, Attachment General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 2, U.N. Doc. A/50/790, S/1995/999 (Nov. 30, 1995).
134. S.C. Res. 1035, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 (Dec. 21, 1995). UNMIBH's
mandate expired in 2002.
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of deaths,3' this was largely brought about by the forceful actions of
the quasi-enforcement operation and the diplomatic intervention of
the United States which led to the Dayton Agreement. The United
Nations was on the sidelines of this process. The nadir of the United
Nations' operations in the former Yugoslavia came in July 1995 in
Srebrenica when some 8,000 Muslim men and boys were massacred in
one of the Security Council's "safe areas," under the noses of
UNPROFOR troops.
13 6
b. Somalia (April 1992 - March 1995)
In April 1992, the United Nations' activities in Somalia began
with the United Nations Operation in Somalia ("UNOSOM ")
137
which had the primary purpose of escorting humanitarian aid to the
civilian population in post-Barr6 Somalia. The situation on the
ground proved too dangerous for the mission to operate in and it was
withdrawn. In December 1992 the Security Council put in place a
quasi-enforcement force,'138 the Unified Taskforce ("UNITAF"), led
by the United States.
39
In March 1993, as UNITAF was preparing to withdraw, Boutros-
Ghali, 14 noting a continuing security threat,"' requested the Security
Council to mandate the returning mission - to be rechristened
UNOSOM II - with a variety of "military tasks."'42 The Secretary-
General observed that in the light of the continuing threat to peace
and security in the country, "UNOSOM II will not be able to
implement [its] mandate unless it is endowed with enforcement
135. By one estimate, approximately 200,000 civilians were killed in Bosnia alone.
See Ruth Wedgwood, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Use of Force,
5 WASH.U. J.L. & POL'Y 69, 74 (2001).
136. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, chs. VII, VIII, U.N. Doc
A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999).
137. UNOSOM I was established by S.C. Res. 751 U.N. Doc. SIRES/751 (Ap. 24,
1992). The mission was originally referred to as "UNOSOM," but after UNOSOM II
was established, it was retroactively renamed UNOSOM I and will be referred to as
such.
138. S.C. Res. 794, 1 7-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
139. Also known as "Operation Restore Hope."
140. The Secretary-General, Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in
Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794, U.N. Doc. S/25354, (Mar. 3,
1993); add. U.N. Doc. S/25354/Add.1 (Mar. 11, 1993); U.N. Doc. S/25354/Add.2 (Mar.
22, 1993).
141. Id. at $1 55.
142. Id. at 1 57.
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powers under Chapter VII of the Charter."'43 The Security Council
acceded to the Secretary-General's request and, in March 1993,'"
acting under Chapter VII, expanded the size and mandate of the
mission.4 Despite the fact that UNITAF, which had been deployed
in 40 percent of the country, initially had 37,000 troops, UNOSOM II
was to carry out its functions in the entire territory with only 28,000
troops. 46  The mandate of UNOSOM II was considerably more
forceful than that of UNOSOM I and assumed many of the functions
of UNITAF. UNOSOM II was to undertake such tasks as preventing
"any resumption of violence and, if necessary [taking] appropriate
action against any faction" violating the cease-fire, securing the
disarmament of the factions, and maintaining security.'47 Moreover,
UNOSOM II was empowered to take "such forceful action as may be
required to neutralize armed elements that attack or threaten to
attack" U.N. personnel or property and that of its agencies, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and NGOs. 14" No mention
was made in the Secretary-General's report or the Security Council
resolution of any obligation on UNOSOM II to limit itself to the use
of force in self-defense.
49
In June 1993, after 25 peacekeepers were killed in a violent
confrontation with forces on the ground, the Security Council, again
acting under Chapter VII, authorized UNOSOM II to take "all
necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed
attacks" on the personnel of UNOSOM II."0 After a failed raid by
U.S. troops (who were acting outside the U.N. command structure) in
143. Id. at $ 58. See also UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING 296 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter "BLUE HELMETS, 3d
ed."].
144. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
145. Id. at$ 6.
146. The Secretary-General, Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in
Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794, U.N. Doc. S/25354, $$ 70-74
(Mar. 3, 1993); add. U.N. Doc. S/25354/Add.1 (Mar. 11, 1993); U.N. Doc.
S/25354/Add.2 (Mar. 22, 1993).
147. S.C. Res. 814, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993) (endorsing the
Secretary-General's Report, supra note 146).
148. Id. at $ 57.
149. Indeed, the Secretary-General's approach to the ROE - which were to be
drafted by the force commander - provides no indication of a desire to see the
amount of force limited in any way, noting only that the actions would need to be
"judged necessary to fulfill the mandate." Id. at $ 88. As noted, the report was
endorsed by the Security Council in S.C. Res. 814, supra note 143, 5.
150. S.C. Res. 837, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (Jun. 6, 1993).
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Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, which led to the death of 18 U.S.
soldiers and hundreds of Somalis, 5' the United States ordered the
withdrawal of its forces. As a result of this withdrawal, in February
1994 152 "UNOSOM II's mandate was redefined in a more limited
way.', 153 While its revised mandate was still authorized under Chapter
VII, it "was no longer to use force to secure disarmament or in
response to cease-fire violations. It would use force only in self-
defence."'' 4 The diminished mission withdrew, rather ignominiously,
before completing its mission; according to the Secretary-General,
this was the first U.N. operation to be withdrawn by the Security
Council in such circumstances. 5
c. Rwanda (October 1993 - March 1996)
Another stain on the United Nations' reputation - to many, the
biggest to date - was the genocide in Rwanda which occurred
despite the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping mission. The tragic
story of Rwanda in 1994 is well known.56  The United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda ("UNAMIR I" 117) was established in
October 1993 to monitor the Arusha Peace Agreement and to
contribute to "the security of the city of Kigali."'58 Almost from the
outset, the mission's commander sought authorization from the
DPKO to use force to pre-empt serious attacks on the Tutsis which -
151. Some estimates run as high as one thousand Somali deaths. See BOUTROS-
GHALI, supra note 114, at 103-104.
152. S.C. Res. 897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/897 (Feb. 4, 1994).
153. GRAY, 2d ed., supra note 69, at 224.
154. Id.
155. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization: The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and
Sustainable Development in Africa , 31, U.N. Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318 (Apr. 13,
1998).
156. See 10 UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 1993-1996 (1996); see also ROMEO DALLAIRE &
BRENT BEARDSLEY, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL (2005).
157. Some, such as the Security Council, referred to the operation as UNAMIR
throughout the mission; others, such as the Secretary-General, divided the mission
into "UNAMIR I" and "UNAMIR II." The Secretary-General uses the term
UNAMIR II in some of its literature but does not list it as a separate operation on its
peacekeeping website. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
at <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>. For the purposes of this article, I use
the term "UNAMIR I" for the mission from October 5, 1993, to May 16, 1994, and
the term "UNAMIR II" for the period from May 17, 1994, when the mandate was
considerably strengthened, onward.
158. S.C. Res. 872 U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (Oct. 5, 1993).
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the mission had been reliably informed'59 - were being planned. This
request was denied. 6°
After a plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi
was shot down on April 6, 1994, "the systematic killing of Tutsis and
of Hutu members of the political opposition began.' ' 61 When 10
Belgian peacekeepers were targeted and killed, the Belgian
government withdrew its contingent" and the Security Council
reduced the size of UNAMIR I from 2,500 to 270 personnel and
downgraded its mandate such that it would "only act as an
intermediary in securing a cease-fire, help in the resumption of
humanitarian assistance and monitor developments.', 63 Some saw the
Security Council's near withdrawal of the mission as having facilitated
the genocide, which continued unabated.
The Security Council responded to the public outcry in ways that
should, by now, be familiar. First, it authorized an increase in the
mission's strength to 5,500 troopsM and gave the mission - by now
referred to by the Secretary-General as UNAMIR II - an expanded
mandate. The mandate was to include contributing to "the security
and protection of... civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through
the establishment of... secure humanitarian areas" and to provide
security for humanitarian operations. 165 Moreover, UNAMIR II was
authorized "to take action in self-defence against persons or groups
who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and
other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and
distribution of humanitarian relief."'" Second, it authorized a
French-led quasi-enforcement operation, Operation Turquoise, under
159. DALLAIRE, supra note 156, at 141-144.
160. In reply to the requests by the force commander for authorization to mount a
military operation, the "DPKO informed UNAMIR headquarters that such action
went beyond the UNAMIR mandate." See UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA, supra
note 156, at 32. As noted by the Independent Inquiry, "the Force Commander
submitted a draft set of Rules of Engagement for UNAMIR on 23 November 1993,
seeking Headquarters' approval. Headquarters never responded to that request." The
Secretary-General, Letter Dated 15 December from the Secretary-General Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, [Enclosing the Report of the Independent Inquiry
into the Actions of the U.N. During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda], 9, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999); see also FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 227.
161. UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA, supra note 156, at 37.
162. Id. at 40; see also BOUTROS-GHALI, supra note 114, at 134.
163. S.C. Res. 912, 8(a)-(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (Apr. 21, 1994).
164. S.C. Res. 918, 91 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994).
165. Id. at I 3(a).
166. Id. at j 4.
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Chapter VII to use "all necessary means ' to create a safe area in the
southwest of the country' However, UNAMIR II was slow to
emerge as U.N. member states proved reluctant to volunteer troops.'69
Before UNAMIR II reached its full strength, the genocide had run its
course with an estimated 800,000 people massacred."
d. Haiti (September 1993 - March 200071)
Finally, another U.N. operation deserves brief mention. The
United Nations Mission in Haiti ("UNMIH") was established in
September 1993 to provide training to local police.172  Due to the
security situation on the ground it was unable to deploy in October
2003 as intended. On July 31, 1994,173 the Security Council authorized
a quasi-enforcement action and member states formed a COTW, the
Multinational Force (MNF), 74 to be led by the United States. The
Security Council established the MNF under Chapter VII and
authorized it to use "all necessary means, 175 to fulfill its aims, which
included facilitating "the departure from Haiti" of the governing
regime (which was in place as a result of a coup against the
democratically elected government). The Security Council also
revised and expanded UNMIH's mandate to include "sustaining the
secure and stable environment [once established by the MNF] and
167. "Operation Turquoise" was "aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to
the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk." S.C.
Res. 929, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (Jun. 22, 1994).
168. "France withdrew according to plan in August and its zone was occupied by
new UNAMIR contingents finally received from African countries." FINDLAY, supra
note 28, at 282.
169. Boutros-Ghali outlined the difficulty the United Nations had finding the
required troops: "On August 1, [1994] I told the Security Council that the United
Nations was as far from attaining the 5,500 troops authorized as it had been on May
17, [1994], the day Resolution 918 had been adopted." BOUTROS-GHALI, supra note
114, at 138-140.
170. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 15 December from the Secretary-
General, supra note 160, at 3.
171. UNMIH was in existence from March 1993 to June 1996 after which it was
replaced by a series of smaller U.N. operations with more limited mandates: U.N.
Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) (Jul. 1996 - Jul. 1997), U.N. Transition Mission
in Haiti (UNTMIH) (Jul. - Nov. 1997) and U.N. Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
(MIPONUH) (Dec. 1997 - Mar. 2000). For subsequent U.N. peacekeeping
operations in Haiti, see infra note 203.
172. S.C. Res. 867 U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (Sept. 23, 1993).
173. S.C. Res. 940 U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (Jul. 31, 1994).
174. Also known as "Operation Uphold Democracy."
175. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 173, at $1 4.
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protecting international personnel and key installations., 176  On
January 30, 1995, after it deemed "a secure and stable environment
177
to exist, the Security Council called for the transfer of responsibility
from the MNF to UNMIH 78  In the same resolution the Security
Council authorized UNMIH to "recruit and deploy military
contingents... sufficient to allow UNMIH to assume the full range of
its functions" as established in previous resolutions.'
79
2. Impact on the Self-Defense Principle
Armed with a basic understanding of these four situations, I will
now turn to the impact UNPROFOR in its later stages, UNAMIR II,
UNOSOM II, and UNMIH in its later stages had on the role of force
in U.N. peacekeeping. 8" As UNPROFOR was gradually empowered
to use greater force, it became clear that the self-defense principle
was being ignored. Confusingly, however, the Security Council was
reluctant to acknowledge this. While the force authorized was, by
any sensible measure, beyond self-defense - as evidenced by the
invocation of Chapter VII, the reference to the use of "necessary
means" and the authorization of increased troop levels 8' - the
Security Council, incongruously, and some might argue
disingenuously, 82 continued to emphasize the self-defense principle in
176. Id. at 5.
177. S.C. Res. 975, T 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/975 (Jan. 30, 1995).
178. Id. at 7.
179. S.C. Res. 975 supra note 177, at 6.
180. The initial missions - UNOSOM I, UNPROFOR (under its initial mandate),
and UNMIH (under its initial mandate) - need not be considered further because
they were not authorized to use force beyond the normal parameters of the self-
defense principle. Similarly, UNAMIR I need not be considered, because while its
mandate could have been interpreted to allow the use of considerable force based,
the DPKO rejected such an interpretation. See discussion supra note 160.
181. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993) (discussed in supra notes
119-121 and corresponding text).
182. See S.C. Res. 836, supra note 119, at 9. As Findlay observes, the mandate
"was designed to give the impression of protecting the safe areas without actually
doing so. In reality attacks on the safe areas were unlikely to be deterred only by the
use of force in self-defence." FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 265. Yasushi Akashi notes:
In many cases, Chapter VII has been cited in Security Council Resolutions
with the caveat "acting in self-defense," which is a right inherent to any
peace-keeping operation regardless of Resolution wording. This routine
combination of Chapter VII and the 'authorization' of the use of force in
self-defense has further compounded the degree of confusion, even among
knowledgeable observers, over the conditions in which force can be used by
UNPROFOR.
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the resolutions. Observers have suggested that the ambiguous
language was necessary to facilitate consensus among Security
Council members.' 83 While this may be the case, and it may indeed
represent "a masterpiece of diplomatic drafting""8 for the Security
Council to have obtained agreement in the circumstances, the result
was a mandate for UNPROFOR that was confusing, contradictory
and unimplementable.'8 Boutros-Ghali highlighted the conflicting
nature of the Security Council's messages: At the same time Security
Council resolution 998 authorizing the RRF called for the addition of
thousands of heavily armed troops to UNPROFOR, it asserted that
"UNPROFOR remained an impartial peacekeeping operation."186 As
Boutros-Ghali remarked, "Alice in Wonderland would have enjoyed
the resolution."187
With UNOSOM II, the Security Council was even more overt in
its disregard of the self-defense principle. With Resolution 837, June
6, 1994, UNOSOM II was vested with a level of forcefulness beyond
that authorized in any previous peacekeeping mission. While, as
noted, the Security Council bestowed upon ONUC18 and the fortified
UNPROFOR mandates allowing them to use considerable force, with
UNOSOM II it went further still: At its most forceful stages, the
Yasushi Akashi, The Use of Force in a United Nations Peace-Keeping Operation:
Lessons Learnt from the Safe Areas Mandate, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 312, 317 (1995-
1996).
183. For example, Findlay describes S.C. Res. 844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/844 (June 18,
1993) which at 2 authorizes the reinforcement of UNPROFOR as a "carefully
worded compromise between those [members of the Security Council] who wished to
use force to protect the safe areas [and those] who were concerned for the well-being
of their troops and believed that real protection was impossible." FINDLAY, supra
note 28, at 265, 228-29.
184. Sashi Tharoor, Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'? 37/4
SURVIVAL 52 (Winter 1995-1996).
185. Akashi notes that the Security Council entrusted UNPROFOR with a
mandate "that it knew, or should have known was not only unrealistic, but impossible
to implement." Akashi, supra note 182, at 315. He continues: that "the creation of
the safe areas was a 'quick fix' response to an immediate problem was evident in the
Security Council's hesitation to provide UNPROFOR with the necessary resources
to implement its mandate." Tharoor describes the resolution as "largely
unimplementable." Tharoor, supra note 184, at 60.
186. Boutros Ghali, supra note 114, at 237.
187. Id.
188. At its most forceful, the Security Council authorized ONUC to "take
vigorous action, including the requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the
immediate apprehension, detention ... or deportation of all foreign military and
paramilitary personnel ... and mercenaries." S.C. Res. 169, supra note 55.
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invocation of Chapter VII was explicit as was its reference to "all
necessary measures" (unlike with ONUC); moreover, the Security
Council did not temper its invocation of Chapter VII with a reference
to the self-defense principle (as it had with the fortified
UNPROFOR).' 89
While the level of force authorized for UNAMIR II and UNMIH
was not as great as that under UNOSOM II or UNPROFOR, the self-
defense principle was effectively ignored with those operations as
well. Neither UNAMIR II nor UNMIH received explicit Chapter
VII authorizations; 9° however, each was clearly vested with the
authority to use considerable force. UNAMIR II's mandate called
upon it to undertake significant security functions, including
contributing to the security and protection of civilians at risk and
providing security for humanitarian operations. The strengthened
UNMIH was given the authority to use considerable force: the
Security Council had authorized it to sustain "a secure and stable
environment" and to protect "international personnel and key
installations.' 9' Yet the United Nations was contradictory on the
issue of the use of force with these two operations - just as it had
been with UNPROFOR in its later stages. Despite each being
bestowed with an obvious potential for the offensive use of force, the
United Nations continued to stress that force should only be used in
self-defense. The Secretary-General, endorsed by the Security
Council, indicated that UNAMIR II should "take action in self-
defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and
populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the
means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief."' 1
189. The wording of S.C. Res. 837, supra note 150, reads "all necessary measures
against all those responsible for the armed attacks" on the personnel of UNOSOM
II. This goes somewhat further than S.C. Res. 836, supra note 119, decided just two
days earlier. Under that resolution, UNPROFOR was authorized to act "in self-
defence, to take necessary measures, including the use of force in reply to
bombardments against the same areas."
190. Cox takes the view that with UNAMIR II the non-invocation of Chapter VII
and the lack of an authorization to use force imply that the Security Council did not
consider the explicit authorization to use force necessary in this case; but that, even
so, forceful measures were contemplated. Cox, supra note 32, at 261. In a similar
vein, Findlay noted in relation to UNMIH that the invocation of Chapter VII may
not have been considered necessary in view of the improved security situation which
arose as a result of the MNF's presence in the country. FINDLAY, supra note 28, at
274-275.
191. S.C. Res. 940, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
192. S.C. Res. 918, supra note 164, 4, (emphasis added). The language used in
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Similarly, the Secretary-General observed that UNMIH was entitled
to use force "in exercise of the right of self-defence, including opposing
forcible attempts to impede the discharge of the Mission's mandate"'
93
at the same time he observed that UNMIH would need to use force to
sustain security in the country when "no other means are adequate or
available. ' '
The only reasonable conclusion that may be drawn from the
above analysis is that the self-defense principle was abandoned during
this period. The United Nations, however, continued to assert that
the self-defense principle applied during and after this period.9  Such
a position could only be justified based on one of two approaches.
One approach would be to argue that "peacekeeping," by its very
nature, excluded operations with enforcement-type powers such as
UNPROFOR. Of course such an approach does not reflect the
reality of the situation: it is the case that operations classed as
peacekeeping by the Secretary-General and the Security Council may
possess enforcement-type powers as I shall address in Part IV.
Moreover, even at the time, UNPROFOR was characterized as
"peacekeeping" by the Security Council and the Secretary-General.'96
Another approach would be to argue that the definition of "self-
defense" was even further expanded such that it included the type of
the resolution is based on that proposed by the Secretary-General. See The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, 15,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/565, (May 13, 1994). The Security Council welcomed this report in
S.C. Res. 918, supra note 164, 2.
193. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question
Concerning Haiti, 64, U.N. Doc. S/1995/46 (Jan. 17, 1995) (emphasis added). The
Security Council considered this report in S.C. Res. 975, supra note 177.
194. Moreover, the strengthened mission's ROE provided that "UNMIH forces
may intervene to prevent death or grievous bodily harm of innocent civilians at the
hands of an armed person or group" and authorized forces to engage in "search,
apprehension, and disarmament" when acting in self-defense. FINDLAY, supra note
28, at 275 (referring to Rule 8 of UNMIH's ROE).
195. The publications of the Secretariat during and immediately after this period
continued to stress the importance of the self-defense principle in U.N.
peacekeeping. See, e.g., GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS,
supra note 77.
196. For example, the Security Council referred to UNPROFOR as a "peace-
keeping operation" as late as June 1995. S.C. Res. 998, supra note 123. Similarly, the
U.N. Secretariat classed UNPROFOR as peacekeeping even when at its most
forceful. See BLUE HELMETS, 3d ed., supra note 143. As late as May 30, 1995, the
Secretary-General insisted that "UNPROFOR is not a peace-enforcement
operation". See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Security Council Resolutions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), 16, U.N. Doc. S/1995/444
(May 30, 1995).
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activities engaged in by UNPROFOR, UNMIH and UNAMIR II.
Under this approach, self-defense would include an obligation to take
measures to protect other people's security (as was the case with the
strengthened UNMIH and UNAMIR II) as well as protecting civilian
safe areas (UNPROFOR), taking "appropriate action" against any
party violating a cease-fire (UNISOM II) and taking measures against
people responsible for previous armed attacks on personnel'97
(UNOSOM II). This would appear to have been the approach of the
Security Council, which, as noted,'98 emphasized the importance of
acting in self-defense at the same time it bestowed forceful powers on
these operations. However, to classify such conduct as self-defense
bears little relation to the normal meaning of the term.'99 If self-
defense were defined so broadly, the self-defense principle would be
nothing more than a legal fiction - and a misleading one at that. Any
advantage to attaching the label "self-defense" to such conduct in
order to persuade a host state into providing consent or other states
to contribute troops,2°° is likely to be short-lived. Indeed, this may
have been a factor in the slowness of states to contribute to
UNAMIR II, notwithstanding the Security Council referring to it as
an "action in self-defence." ''
B. The Self-Defense Principle Reprised.- Supplement to an Agenda
The four operations under consideration were generally viewed
either to be patent failures or, at best, of very limited success. In the
former Yugoslavia, U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage and some
"safe areas" were overrun and their inhabitants systematically
killed . UNPROFOR became marginalized with regard to its non-
197. That is to say, not in immediate reply thereto.
198. See discussion supra notes 181-187 and corresponding text.
199. Alternatively, inclusion of such activities as self-defense could be taken as an
illustration of the defense of mandate approach to self-defense. As noted in the
discussion supra notes 82-88 and corresponding text, the defense of mandate
approach does not appear to have any limits: Any activity - including offensive
action - could be said to serve to defend the mission. Cox relies on the Secretary-
General's invocation of the defense of mandate approach (as noted in The Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
9, U.N. Doc. S/24540, (Sept. 10, 1992)) as authority for her conclusion that the
Secretary-General was "of the opinion that self-defense could include situations
involving the protection of third parties." Cox, supra note 32, at 260.
200. See discussion supra note 90 and corresponding text.
201. S.C. Res. 918, supra note 164, 4.
202. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999).
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forceful function of facilitating peace agreements; its role in the
formulation of the Dayton Agreement was limited. With the
situation in Somalia, UNOSOM II proved ill-suited and ill-equipped
to carry out the enforcement functions asked of it. When casualties
began to occur, the operation withdrew. The atrocities in Rwanda -
estimated to have led to the killing of over 800,000 - are notorious.
Haiti was perhaps the most successful of the four operations because
it was able to facilitate peace - in the short term at least.23
Two lessons emerged: First, that giving peacekeeping operations
enforcement-type powers will not work; and, second, that the United
Nations must not stand by while the mass loss of lives ensued.2°, The
logical conclusion arising from these two lessons is that the level of
force authorized by peacekeeping missions should be strictly limited;
where force is required to prevent the loss of lives, the United
Nations must rely on its enforcement powers. However, another
conclusion is possible: That there is nothing inherently wrong with the
Security Council authorizing peacekeeping missions to use offensive
force - but if it does so, it needs to make sure the level of force
authorized is increased to a sufficient degree that such operations are
successful and can ensure the protection of the nationals of the state
and perhaps even forcibly restore peace to an area. By 1995,
Boutros-Ghali had embraced the first conclusion; as we shall see in
Part IV, Kofi Annan was to embrace the second.
In January 1995, Boutros-Ghali produced A Supplement to An
203. The situation in Haiti was not stable for long. After a decade of relative calm
in Haiti after Aristide's reinstallment as President in 1994, serious armed conflict
broke out in early February 2004 and insurgents took control of part of the country.
In February 2004, the Security Council authorized the United States-led quasi-
enforcement operation, the Multinational Interim Force (MIF). S.C. Res. 1529, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004). On April 30, the Security Council established the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to take over many of
the MIF's functions on June 1, 2004. MINUSTAH was to maintain a secure
environment in the country and was authorized under Chapter VII to undertake
various forceful tasks including assisting with disarmament and the restoration and
maintenance of rule of law, public safety and public order. S.C. Res. 1542, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004.)
204. Simon Chesterman makes this point well with the following passage:
The three peace operations in which troops under UN command engaged in
the use of force on a significant scale - Congo from 1960-1963, Somalia in
1993, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1994-1995 - were traumatic
experiences for the organization; the controversies to which they gave rise
were surpassed only by two occasions on which force was not used at all: in
Rwanda and Srebrenica;
SIMON CHESTERMAN, THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS 5 (2004).
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Agenda for Peace.25 While Boutros-Ghali made staunch assertions
that he was not retreating from his positions in the earlier
document,2°6 such assertions were scarcely convincing. Reading
between the lines of Supplement to An Agenda for Peace it is clear
that he was, indeed, backtracking on some of his more radical ideas in
An Agenda for Peace. First, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace has
the effect of redacting the word "hitherto" from the definition in An
Agenda for Peace, and its attendant suggestion that non-consensual
peacekeeping missions are acceptable.2' Looking back on previous
missions, Boutros-Ghali observes a link between a mission's success
and the United Nations' respect for the consent principle.2 8 Second,
he moves away from his earlier willingness to blur the concepts of
peacekeeping and enforcement. In Supplement to An Agenda for
Peace he posits that "[p]eace-keeping and the use of force (other than
in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as
adjacent points on a spectrum, permitting easy transition from one to
the other." 2°9 Tellingly, he observes:
[N]othing is more dangerous for a peace-keeping operation than to
ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic
support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of
peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are
quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the
latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping
is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two
205. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper
of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United
Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1991/1 (Jan. 3, 1995).
206. Boutros Ghali notes, somewhat incongruously, that "[m]ost of the ideas in An
Agenda for Peace have proved themselves." He further notes that the purpose of
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace "is not to revise An Agenda for Peace nor call
into question structures and procedures that have been tested by time." Id. at 6.
207. In fact, Boutros-Ghali had done so even before the publication of Supplement
to An Agenda for Peace. As Findlay observed, Boutros-Ghali had earlier "quietly
reverted to the traditional definition of peacekeeping as requiring 'the consent of the
parties."' FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 318. For authority on this, Findlay relied on The
Secretary-General, Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peace-keeping:
Report of the Secretary-General, 2, U.N. Doc. A/48/403, A/26450, (Mar. 14, 1994).
208. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 205, at 33; see also 23, where he stressed that
peacekeeping "can be employed only with the consent of the parties to the conflict."
This is in clear contrast with the position he advanced in An Agenda for Peace, see
discussion, supra note 97 and corresponding text.
209. Id. at $ 36. At 33 he stressed the importance of force only being used in
self-defense if a peacekeeping mission is to be successful. See also his Introduction in
BLUE HELMETS, 3d ed., supra note 143, at 6.
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can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping operation and
210endanger its personnel.
In short, Boutros-Ghali appears to be conceding that his bold
experiment in bestowing enforcement powers on peacekeeping
operations was a failure.
U.N. peacekeeping emerged from this, its second forceful period,
in something of a crisis.211 Much like the introspectiveness that came
about after ONUC in the Congo, there was a certain amount of soul
searching within the organization as a result of the problems with the
missions in the early 1990s. A sense that peacekeeping could not
succeed where it featured force beyond self-defense was evident from
other documentation prepared by the Secretariat under Boutros-
Ghali's stewardship, such as its 1995 General Guidelines on
Peacekeeping.22 This view was confirmed by a Commission of Inquiry
established to consider the attacks against UNOSOM 11, 213 which
recommended that the United Nations "refrain from undertaking
further peace-enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of
states.,214 The conclusion that enforcement-type powers and
peacekeeping do not mix was one shared by many of the
commentators of the day.2" As noted by one, "Somalia (1993) and
210. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 205, at 35.
211. Writing in 1995, Tharoor noted that "Peace-keeping today is... in flux, if not
in crisis." Sashi Tharoor, The Changing Face of Peace-Keeping and Peace-
Enforcement, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 408, 426 (1995-1996). Another observer spoke
of the "death of peacekeeping" during this period and noted that when the former
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Bernard Miyet, was appointed in 1997,
"many people called him the 'commissioner of liquidation' of U.N. peacekeeping."
Abiodun Williams, The United Nations and Peace Operations, Occasional Paper No.
2: Dean Rusk Center, University of Georgia School of Law 37, (2002) available at
<www.uga.edu/ruskcenter/pdfs/occasional2anniv.pdf>.
212. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, supra note 77. See
passage quoted, supra note 196. Findlay also refers to the UN DPKO's Peacekeeping
Training Manual, (2d ed. 1997) in FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 323-326.
213. The Secretary-General, Note by Secretary-General, Appendix: Report of the
Commission on Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885
(1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM H Personnel Which Led to
Casualties Among Them, U.N. Doc. S/1994/653 (June 1, 1994).
214. Id. at 48; see also Gray, who observes a trend in at least one member state
(See the U.S. President's Decision Directive on Reforming Multilateral Peace
Operations, 33 I.L.M. 795 (1994)), as well as in some regional organizations such as
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE 31 I.L.M. 1385
(1992)) or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS 35 I.L.M. 738 (1996)) to
adhere to a more traditional concept of peacekeeping whereby force is not used
except in self-defense. GRAY, 2d ed., supra note 69, at 227.
215. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 103, at 449; see also, Akashi, supra note 182, at
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Bosnia (1994-1995) confirmed the emerging view that forces under
U.N. command were unsuited to war-fighting.
216
The result of this period was a significant retrenchment in U.N.
peacekeeping. From the beginning of 1995 to the end of Boutros-
Ghali's term two years later, the Security Council created no new
peacekeeping missions in places where the United Nations was not
already involved.217 By 1996, the number of peacekeepers deployed
around the world had fallen to under 20,000, as compared to over
70,000 in 1993.218 In the words of one commentator, the "Somalia and
Bosnia debacles" caused the United Nations to "pull 'back to
basics. 219
IV. The Current Approach to Peacekeeping and Force
Introduction
Whereas the hard lesson that Boutros-Ghali woke up to after the
operations in the early 1990s was that peacekeeping will not work if it
uses force beyond self-defense, Annan reached a different conclusion.
For Annan, the lesson from this period appears to have been that the
United Nations failed because its peacekeeping had not been forceful
enough. His position may have been linked to a personal sense of
remorse relating to his involvement in the events in Srebrenica and
Rwanda.2 ° The impact of these tragedies was to come into sharp
relief in late 1999 when two highly critical reports detailing the
United Nations' failures in Srebrenica 221 and Rwanda222 were issued
320; GRAY, 2d ed., supra note 69, at 228; FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 315.
216. CHESTERMAN, supra note 204, at 9.
217. Of the missions established in the period, one related to a previous U.N.
operation in Angola (UNAVEM III), six related to the United Nations' activities in
the former Yugoslavia (UNPREDEP, UNCRO, UNMIBH, UNTAES, UNPSG, and
UNMOP) and one followed on from UNMIH in Haiti (UNSMIH).
218. ALEX J. BELLAMY, PAUL WILLIAMS & STUART GRIFFIN, UNDERSTANDING
PEACEKEEPING (2004).
219. FINDLAY, supra note 28, at 315.
220. Annan was Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from
March 1992 to February 1993 and Under-Secretary-General from March 1993 to
December 1996 before becoming the Secretary-General in January 1997.
221. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 202.
222. The Secretary-General, The Report of the Independent Inquiry into the
Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999).
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within a month of each other. These reports led to Annan's
expressing his "deep remorse" that the United Nations had not done
more to prevent the genocide in Rwanda 3 and his "deepest regret
and remorse" in relation to the massacres in Srebrenica.224 Tellingly,
he also made the following comment at the time: "Of all my aims as
Secretary-General, there is none to which I feel more deeply
committed than that of enabling the United Nations never again to
fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass
slaughter.22
In the first 18 months of his first term as Secretary-General,
Annan was cautious in his approach to the use of force in
peacekeeping. During the period from January 1997 to June 1999,
peacekeeping missions were established in Guatemala,226 Angola, 7
Haiti 2 2 the Central African Republic229 and Sierra Leone.230 None of
223. Annan stated,
All of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent [the
Rwandan genocide]. There was a United Nations force in the country at the
time, but it was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful
action which would have been needed to prevent or halt the genocide. On
behalf of the United Nations, I acknowledge this failure and express my
deep remorse.
Press Release, The Secretary-General, Kofi Annan Emphasizes Commitment to
Enabling UN Never Again to Fail in Protecting Civilian Population from Genocide
or Mass Slaughter, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7263, AFR/196 (Dec. 16, 1999).
224. Press Release, The Secretary-General, Srebrenica Tragedy Will Forever
Haunt United Nations History, says Secretary-General on Fifth Anniversary of City's
Fall, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7489 (July 10, 2000).
225. Kofi Annan Emphasizes Commitment, supra note 223.
226. United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala was established within a
larger civilian and humanitarian mission, the "United Nations Mission for the
Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Comprehensive
Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala" (MINUGUA). (S.C. Res. 1094, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1094 (Jan. 20, 1997)). The United Nations Verification Mission in
Guatemala is referred to by the DPKO as MINUGUA. See United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping, at <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.
227. United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) (S.C. Res. 1118,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1118 (June 30, 1997)).
228. United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) (S.C. Res. 1123, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/l123 (July 30, 1997)) and United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
(MIPONUH) (S.C. Res. 1141, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1141 (Nov. 28, 1997)).
229. United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) (S.C.
Res. 1159, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1159 (Mar. 27, 1998)).
230. United Nations Mission of Observers in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (S.C. Res.
1181, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1181 (July 13, 1998)). UNOMSIL was followed by the more
forceful United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). S.C. Res. 1270, U.N.
Doc. SIRES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999).
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these missions were given Chapter VII mandates and none were
authorized to use levels of force even approaching that authorized for
UNPROFOR or UNOSOM II.
However, beginning in June 1999, the United Nations again
embraced the use of force in peacekeeping. From June 1999 to the
time of writing, the Security Council has established one or more
peacekeeping missions in the following 10 countries or regions:"'
Kosovo,232 Sierra Leone,233 East Timor, 3" the Democratic Republic of
the Congo,235 Ethiopia and Eritrea,236 C6te d'Ivoire,237 Liberia,238
Haiti, 239 Burundi,240 and Sudan.4' Remarkably, in nine of the 10
situations the peacekeeping missions were given explicit Chapter VII
authorization for at least part of their existence and for at least part of
the territory in which they operated. With the tenth mission, that in
Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Security Council has signaled its intention
231. Several other operations, described as "political and peace-building missions"
rather than "peacekeeping" by DPKO were established during the period in
question. However, in the light of the fact that none of these missions appear to have
been authorized to use force beyond self-defense, I will not consider them in this
discussion.
232. United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo ("UNMIK").
Although UNMIK was authorized under Chapter VII, it does not appear to be
authorized to use significant force. As noted by Gray: "The invocation of Chapter
VII was ... necessary not to give UNMIK any wide right to use force, but, first, to
authorize force by member states [a quasi-enforcement operation was authorized in
the same resolution] and, second, to legitimize the very wide powers of UNMIK to
restore a semblance of normal life to the province and to make clear that its
operations did not depend on the consent of Yugoslavia." GRAY, 2d ed., supra note
69, at 230.
233. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAMSIL").
234. There have been three peacekeeping missions in East Timor during the
relevant period. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
("UNTAET") was a precursor of United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor
("UNMISET"), which was a precursor to the current United Nations Integrated
Mission in Timor-Leste ("UNMIT"). The first two missions were each given Chapter
VII authorizations.
235. United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo ("MONUC").
236. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea ("UNMEE").
237. There were two peacekeeping missions in Crte d'Ivoire during the relevant
period. United Nations Mission in Cote D'Ivoire ("MUNCUI") and its successor,
United Nations Operation in Crte d'Ivoire ("UNOCI"). Chapter VII was only relied
upon for the latter mission.
238. United Nations Mission in Liberia ("UNMIL").
239. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti ("MINUSTAH").
240. United Nations Operation in Burundi ("ONUB").
241. United Nations Mission in Sudan ("UNMIS").
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to grant an explicit Chapter VII mandate if the parties do not alter
their behavior.
42
A. The Self-Defense Principle Abandoned?: The Brahimi Report
The critical reports on the U.N. peacekeeping efforts in
Srebrenica and Rwanda243 - perhaps coupled with a growing
willingness to speak out against state sovereignty being used as a basis
for abusive governments to harm their own people 244 and a developing
focus on the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict 2 45 _
appear to have been the impetus for Annan's decision to convene the
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("Panel") in March 2000.
He established the Panel "to undertake a thorough review of the
United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set
of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the
United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.
'2' 6
242. In S.C. Res. 1640, U.N. Doc. S[RES/1640 (Nov. 23, 2005), the Security
Council warned Eritrea to stop interfering with UNMEE's freedom of movement
and called on both Eritrea and Ethiopia to refrain from the threat or use of force.
The Security Council further noted its determination to take action under Chapter
VII if the parties failed to comply. Most recently, in S.C. Res. 1741, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1741 (Jan. 30, 2007), the Security Council reiterated these demands (though it
did not reiterate its determination to act under Chapter VII).
243. William J. Durch, et al. cited these reports - which "reopened some old
wounds and... suggested a potentially terminal crisis for UN peace operations" - as
a factor in the Secretary-General's decision to establish the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations. William J. Durch et al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN
Peace Operations 5 (2003), available at <www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=90>.
244, Durch, et al. write of "NATO's 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia and
the Secretary-General's speeches arguing that sovereignty could no longer be
considered a shield behind which a country's citizens might be abused or killed with
impunity" as being a basis for contemplating more robust U.N. operations. Id. at 22.
245. In S.C. Res. 1296 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1296 (Apr. 19, 2000), the Security Council
referred to "its intention to ensure, where appropriate and feasible, that
peacekeeping missions are given suitable mandates and adequate resources to
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger." This resolution was cited
by the Secretary-General as the basis upon which "the mandates of peacekeeping
operations have been broadened to allow troops to physically protect civilians under
imminent threat of violence." The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, 1 8,
U.N. Doc. S/2004/431 (May 28, 2004). In a subsequent document, the Security
Council's commitment was seemingly strengthened; it did not include the words
"where appropriate and feasible." The President of the Security Council, Statement
by the President of the Security Council 3, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/46 (Dec. 14, 2004).
246. Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000), available at <www.un.org>. According to Findlay, the
Brahimi Report represented "the most far-reaching examination of UN peacekeeping
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The Panel's Report,247 which came to be known as the "Brahimi
Report," was released on August 21, 2000. The report reflected a
deep sense of regret at the United Nations' failures in Rwanda and
Srebrenica 248 and made many far-reaching recommendations,
2 49
several of which impact on the question of the appropriate level of
forcefulness in peacekeeping operations.
The Brahimi Report's recommendations in relation to force in
peacekeeping operations fell into two categories. First, the Panel
made recommendations relating to what it saw as an obligation on the
part of peacekeeping missions to protect civilians. The Brahimi
Report asserted that peacekeepers "who witness violence against
civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their
means, in support of basic United Nations principles and ...
consistent with 'the perception and the expectation of protection
created by [an operation's] very presence.' 251 Second, the Brahimi
Report recommended that peacekeeping missions be given mandates
that were far more robust than they had tended to be historically. It
provided:
Rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-for-
stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a
source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at
the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly
dangerous situations, should not force United Nations contingents
to cede the initiative to their attackers.25'
in its history." FINDLAY,supra note 28, at 333.
247. Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000), available at <www.un.org>.
248. According to the Brahimi Report, "[n]o failure did more to damage the
standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its
reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor." Id. at ix.
249. For two excellent discussions of the Brahimi Report, see Nigel D. White,
Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operation (The
Brahimi Report), 6/1 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 127 (2001), and Christine Gray,
Peacekeeping After the Brahimi Report: Is There a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?,
6/2 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 267 (2001).
250. Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, 62, U.N. Doc.
A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000), available at <www.un.org>. The quoted
passage within the larger quotation comes from The Secretary-General, The Report
of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994
Genocide in Rwanda, 51, addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999).
251. Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, 49, U.N. Doc.
A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000), available at <www.un.org>.
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The Brahimi Report called for bigger, better equipped, more
confrontational 2 forces which were able to pose a credible deterrent.
It called for forces which were "sized and configured so as to leave no
doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers" that peacekeeping's "non-
threatening '' 1 3 character had been moved away from.
At the same time it called for protection of civilians and robust
mandates, the Brahimi Report endorsed the self-defense principle,
thereby creating an ambiguous message. For example, while the
report labeled the self-defense principle (along with the need for
consent of the parties and impartiality) a "bedrock" '254 principle of
peacekeeping - noting that it should remain so - it also made clear
that the Panel considered these bedrock principles to be largely
outdated concepts, potentially hindering successful peacekeeping
operations.255  Similarly, although the report implied that
peacekeepers should not engage in enforcement-type activity, it does
not state this explicitly1 6 There is nothing novel in observing that
252. The Report also stated,
There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not
be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the
United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be
prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability
and determination to defeat them.
Id. at 1 1.
253. Id. at T 51.
254. Id. at $ 48.
255. While the focus of this article is the use of force, as noted supra note 5, it is
interlinked with consent and impartiality. Regarding consent, while not suggesting
that it may not always be required, by highlighting the problems with a consent
requirement (it can be manipulated by the local parties, it can be granted by a party
merely to win time to rearm and withdrawn when the operation no longer serves its
interests) the report leaves the suggestion that requiring consent can hinder a
successful mission. Id. at 48. On the question of the need for impartiality, the
report observed that this did not mean "neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in
all cases for all time" which, it noted "can amount to a policy of appeasement."
Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, T 50, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000), available at <www.un.org)>. In linking impartiality with
the use of force in self-defense, the report noted that in some cases where there are
obvious aggressors and victims, "peacekeepers may not only be operationally
justified in using force but morally compelled to do so." Id.
256. The Panel "recognizes that the United Nations does not wage war. Where
enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of
willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter." Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, 53, U.N.
Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000), available at <www.un.org>. Of course,
noting that in the past there has been consistent reliance on COTW-led operations to
undertake enforcement functions is not the same as recommending that future
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peacekeepers must be capable of defending themselves or their
mission or ensuring they are suitably equipped to do so; nor is it a
departure from previous interpretations of self-defense to call for
defense of the mandate. However, by calling for robust and
confrontational peacekeeping mandates - including the report's
proposal to move away from peacekeeping's non-threatening
character 17 - without engaging in a careful discussion of the need for
limits on the use of force, the Brahimi Report opened the door to the
possibility of attributing enforcement-type functions to peacekeeping
operations. Its approach is reminiscent of the "studied ambiguity
2 58
which was a feature of the Security Council's resolutions relating to
the mandate of UNPROFOR where the Security Council authorized
the use of offensive force at the same time it stressed that the
operation should use force only in self-defense.
The ambiguous way in which the Brahimi Report dealt with the
use of force did not go unnoticed by certain member states of the
General Assembly, which saw its findings as a potential intrusion on
state sovereignty.29 It may have been in order to reassure these states
that the Secretary-General observed that he did not consider the
Brahimi Report's recommendations to "turn the United Nations into
a war-fighting machine or to fundamentally change the principles
according to which peacekeepers use force. '' 260 Absent from the
Secretary-General's reassurance was any reference to the self-defense
principle. A leery General Assembly decided to "take note" of the
Brahimi Report, a measure which was described by one observer as "a
polite but noncommittal acknowledgment., 261  For its part, the
Security Council2 62 was more supportive of the report's call for
increased forcefulness. It recognized the "critical importance of
peacekeeping forces be prohibited from using enforcement-type levels of force.
257. Id. at $ 51.
258. This term is used by Chesterman to describe some of the Security Council's
peacekeeping mandates and their treatment of the use of force. CHESTERMAN, supra
note 204, at 3.
259. This was particularly the case with developing states. See Durch, et al., supra
note 243, at 7-8.
260. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, $
7(e), U.N. Doc. A/55/502, (Oct. 20, 2000).
261. Durch, et al., supra note 243.
262. In S.C. Res. 1318, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1318 (Sept. 7, 2000) the Security Council
"welcomed" the Brahimi Report and, later, in S.C. Res. 1327, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1327
(Nov. 12, 2000), it endorsed many of its recommendations.
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peacekeeping operations having, where appropriate and within their
mandates, a credible deterrent capability 26 3 and undertook to
"ensure that the mandated tasks of peacekeeping operations are
appropriate to the situation on the ground, including such factors as
the prospects for success, the potential need to protect civilians and
the possibility that some parties may seek to undermine peace
through violence."26' Moreover, the report emphasized that the ROE
for U.N. peacekeeping "should... support the accomplishment of the
mission's mandate. 2 65 Nowhere in either resolution did the Security
Council mention the self-defense principle or any other limitation on
the use of force by peacekeepers.
B. Overview of the Operations
The analysis of its operations shows that by the end of the 1990s,
the United Nations was, once again, on a path to greater forcefulness
in peacekeeping. As noted, explicit Chapter VII authorizations were
given to U.N. peacekeeping missions in all but one of the countries or
regions where new missions were authorized since June 1999.266 In
accordance with the recommendations from the Brahimi Report,
these Chapter VII authorizations were either to provide security for
civilians on the ground (in addition to the mission's own security) -
what I will refer to as a "civilian protection mandate" - or to
undertake forceful activities even beyond the protection of civilians
- what I will refer to as "robust mandates." Frequently, missions
were granted both types of authorization. I will begin by discussing
the Security Council's attribution of civilian protection functions to
peacekeeping operations and then consider operations with "robust
mandates."
1. Missions with Civilian Protection Mandates
Since June 1999, the Security Council has passed resolutions
calling on peacekeeping operations in eight countries or regions, 267 to
263. S.C. Res. 1327, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1327 (Nov. 12, 2000).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 232-241 and corresponding text for a list of these missions.
267. These include: Sierra Leone (S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22,
1999) and S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000)); The Democratic
Republic of Congo (S.C. Res. 1291, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1291 (Feb. 24, 2000) and S.C.
Res. 1493, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003)); Liberia (S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc.
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protect civilians under imminent threat, as well as U.N. personnel
and, occasionally, associated bodies26 or humanitarian workers."'
Because most of these missions were given a civilian protection
mandate at the same time that they were authorized to use robust
force for other matters,2 7° it can be difficult to distinguish the impact
of the civilian protection mandate on the potential use of force in
peacekeeping from that stemming from the robust mandate. The
wording of most civilian protection mandates is similar, though there
are slight variations. The following paragraph from the United
Nations Mission in the Sudan ("UNMIS")17 1 is typical:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
[the Security Council] [d]ecides that UNMIS is authorized to take
S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003)); C6te d'Ivoire (S.C.Res. 1528, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528
(Feb. 27, 2004)); Haiti (S.C. Res. 1542, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (April 30, 2004));
Burundi (S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004)) and Sudan (S.C. Res.
1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005)). Moreover, in its resolution renewing
UNIFIL and augmenting its strength, the Security Council included a civilian
protection mandate (S.C. 1701, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006)). In Annex 1 to
her study, Virginia Holt provides two extremely helpful charts. One looks at Security
Council resolutions with direct reference to provision of protection for civilians and the
other looks at Security Council resolutions with implications for the protection of
civilians. Victoria Holt, The Responsibility To Protect: Considering The Operational
Capacity For Civilian Protection, The Henry L. Stimson Center Discussion Paper (Jan.
2005) (prepublication draft), available at <www.stimson.org/
fopo/pdf/StimsonCivPro-pre-pubdraftFebO4.pdf>. While the mandates of the
operation in East Timor had elements that could impact on civilian protection
(UNTAET was mandated is to "provide security and maintain law and order
throughout the territory of East Timor" (S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct.
25, 1999)) and to "reply robustly to the militia threat in East Timor," (S.C. Res. 1319,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1319 (Sept. 20, 2000)), the mission did not have an explicit civilian
protection mandate along the lines discussed herein. Similarly, while UNMIK was
empowered to provide security "to maintain civil law and order" (S.C. Res. 1244, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999)), it was not an explicit civilian protection mandate.
268. For example, UNMIS was charged with ensuring "the security and freedom
of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, joint assessment
mechanism and assessment and evaluation commission personnel." S.C. Res. 1590,
16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005).
269. E.g., S.C. Res. 1493, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo); S.C. Res. 1590, supra note 268.
270. Three missions, UNAMSIL, MONUC, and UNMIS were initially given only
civilian protection mandates; robust mandates were added at a later point (regarding
UNMIS's robust mandate see supra note 283).
271. S.C. Res. 1590, supra note 268. UNMIS was established by S.C. Res. 1547,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1547 (June 11, 2004), in part, to take over the functions of a
previously existing political mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
(UNAMIS). For a discussion of UNAMIS's work, see The Secretary General, Report
of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, 5-10, U.N. Doc. S/2005/57 (Jan. 31, 2005).
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the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as
it deems within its capabilities, to protect United Nations
personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the
security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel,
humanitarian workers, joint assessment mechanism and assessment
and evaluation commission personnel, and, without prejudice to the
responsibility of the Government of Sudan, to protect civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence.2 2
With all civilian protection mandates the requirement to protect
civilians "under imminent threat of physical violence" is limited to
that which can be accomplished by the mission "within its
capabilities ' '27 3 and "within its areas of deployment., 274  As such,
considerable discretion is left to the head of mission.275 Typically the
civilian protection mandate will make reference to the fact that the
primary security responsibilities lie with the government or a quasi-
enforcement operation, if present. While not explicitly saying so,
such a reference implies that the use of force by the peacekeeping
mission to protect civilians should be a last resort. All civilian
protection mandates have invoked Chapter VII and many feature
language authorizing "the necessary action, 276 or (where the civilian
protection mandate and a robust mandate are put in place at the same
time) "all necessary means. ''277  In none of the Security Council
resolutions establishing the civilian protection mandates or the
reports of the Secretary-General advising the Security Council on the
272. S.C. Res. 1590, supra note 268, at 16.
273. This language or a slight variation (e.g., with ONUB in Burundi the wording
was "within its capacity" S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004)) was
used in all civilian protection mandates (see supra note 267 for a list of Security
Council resolutions setting out the mandates).
274. This language or a slight variation (see, e.g., ONUB where the wording was
"in the areas where its armed units are deployed" S.C. Res. 1545, supra note 273) was
used in all civilian protection mandates (see supra note 267 for a list of Security
Council resolutions setting out the mandates).
275. Holt noted that the wording means that it falls "to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the force commander or another actor further
down the chain to 'deem' [an act of protection] to be within the scope of 'its
capabilities."' Holt, supra note 267, at 14.
276. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1270, supra note 230; S.C. Res. 1291, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1291 (Feb. 24, 2000); S.C. Res. 1590, supra note 268.
277. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 267; see also S.C. Res. 1545, supra note
273, which spoke of "the necessary measures." With the civilian protection mandate
established in 2004 for MONUC, the "all necessary means" language was clearly
intended to apply to the civilian protection aspect of the mandate as well as to the
robust aspect. See discussion supra notes 303 and 304.
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level of force required, is any reference to a self-defense limitation
made.278
2. Missions with Robust Mandates
In eight279 of the 10 countries or regions where new peacekeeping
missions have been established since 1999, the missions have been
given robust mandates authorizing them to use considerable force -
in circumstances beyond the protection of civilians.2 ° Moreover, with
UNIFIL in the Lebanon, established in 1978,21 the Security Council
revised its mandate in 2006, such that, arguably at least, it too was
given a robust mandate.m With some missions the Security Council
has gone so far as to authorize them to use of "all necessary means,"
or language of a similar nature, to achieve certain of their tasks. 3 In
278. Indeed the word "self-defense" is absent from the mandates of all the
missions under consideration.
279. See supra note 242, regarding UNMEE, which does not currently possess a
Chapter VII mandate. Further, while the mandate of UNMIK was authorized under
Chapter VII, its mandate is not robust. See supra note 232.
280. These are Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL after February 2000), East Timor
(UNTAET/UNMISET), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC after July
2003), Liberia (UNMIL), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Burundi
(ONUB) and Sudan (UNMIS after Aug. 31, 2006, but see supra note 283).
281. UNIFIL's original mandate was set out in S.C. Res. 425 and S.C. Res. 426
supra 79.
282. S.C. Res. 1701, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006). This resolution,
which describes the situation in Lebanon as constituting a "threat to international
peace and security" but which does not specifically invoke Chapter VII, does not
adopt the language typically associated with a robust mandate. However, it does
indicate the Security Council's desire "to supplement and enhance the force in
numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations." The mandate was criticized
as lacking clarity in relation to operation's authority to use force. See, e.g., Michael
Rose, Without a Clear Mandate, the UN Troops in Lebanon are Heading for Disaster,
INDEP. ON SUNDAY (London), Aug. 27, 2006, at 37.
283. Beginning in 1999 the Security Council authorized UNAMSIL to take "the
necessary action" to protect its security and freedom of movement and to protect
civilians under an imminent threat. S.C. Res. 1270, supra note 230, 14. From 2000
to 2002 it favored the phrases "all necessary measures" or "the necessary action" in
the mandates of three peacekeeping missions. For example, UNTAET in East Timor
was authorized to take "all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate" in S.C. Res.
1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999); UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone was
permitted "to take the necessary action to fulfill the additional tasks" in S.C. Res.
1289, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000) and UNMISET in East Timor was
authorized to "take the necessary actions.., to fulfill its mandate" in S.C. Res. 1410,
.6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002). By 2003 the Security Council moved to
the "all necessary means" language. For example, MONUC was permitted to take
"all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems it
within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu" in S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 269)
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each case the Security Council has authorized these peacekeeping
missions to take on similar or identical responsibilities to those
previously held by quasi-enforcement operations. In some instances,
the personnel of the quasi-enforcement operations were simply "re-
hatted" as members of the missions led by the United Nations.2
This part of the article will consider the mandates of two
missions with robust mandates, each of which echoes the attempt to
bestow enforcement powers on peacekeeping operations in the early
1990s. I will first consider United Nations Organization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("MONUC"). Here a
peacekeeping operation was charged with taking over security
functions previously undertaken by a quasi-enforcement operation, as
was the case in UNOSOM II and, to a lesser extent, the strengthened
UNMIH. Second, I will consider United Nations Operation in C6te
d'Ivoire ("UNOCI") where a peacekeeping operation was mandated
to carry out security functions concurrently with a quasi-enforcement
operation, using similar levels of force. This operation is reminiscent
of UNPROFOR and, to a lesser extent, UNAMIR II.
a. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (December 2000 -
Present)
In November 1999,2 the Security Council established MONUC,
a military liaison team charged with establishing contacts with the
parties, planning and providing information. 6 In February 2000,87
and UNOCI was authorized to take "all necessary means to carry out its mandate
within its capabilities and its areas of deployment" in S.C. Res. 1528, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004). In a letter dated November 6, 2004 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UNOCI was "authorized
to use all necessary means, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to prevent
hostile action." U.N. Doc. S/2004/886. Moreover, ONUB was permitted "all
necessary means" within its capacity to carry out certain parts of its mandate in S.C.
Res. 1545, supra note 273 and, UNMIS was authorized to take "all necessary means,
in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities" in
relation to the Darfur region. Here the Security Council, for the first time,
specifically invited "the consent of the Government of National Unity for the
deployment". This consent has yet to be granted at the time of writing. S.C. Res.
1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
284. For more on the re-hatting of forces, see UN Secretariat's Peacekeeping Best
Practices Unit, Re-hatting ECOWAS Forces as UN Peacekeepers: Lessons Learned,
(Aug. 2005), available at <pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Tranformation%20from%
20ECOWAS%20to%20UN%20forces%20-%2OFinal%20Document.pdf>.
285. S.C. Res. 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999)
286. Id. at 5.
287. S.C. Res. 1291, supra note 276.
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the Security Council increased its size and expanded its mandate.2 "
While most of its new tasks were of a non-forceful nature,289 MONUC
was given a civilian protection mandate at this time.29 In December
2002, faced with security concerns (in particular in the Ituri region of
the country), the Security Council agreed to "a revised concept of
operations, 291 whereby personnel would be increased to up to 8,700
and two "robust task forces" would be formed to provide increased
security for the mission.29
In May 2003,293 the Security Council authorized the establishment
of a COTW-led quasi-enforcement operation, the Interim Emergency
Multinational Force ("IEMF"),294 to aid with security the town of
Bunia, the capital of the Ituri District. 5 In the months leading up to
the IEMLF's withdrawal, the Security Council increased MONUC's
288. Id. at 4. Forces were to be deployed in a phased manner.
289. These tasks included monitoring the implementation of the cease-fire
agreement, establishing liaison with the parties, supervising the disengagement of the
parties' forces, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and deploying mine experts. S.C.
Res. 1291, supra note 276, at 1 7.
290. This mandate called on it to take the "necessary action" in the areas of its
deployment and as it deemed within its capabilities to "protect United Nations and
co-located JMC [Joint Military Commission] personnel, facilities, installations and
equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence." S.C. Res. 1291, supra
note 276, at 1 8.
291. S.C. Res. 1445, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1445 (Dec. 4, 2002).
292. The Secretary-General, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 72, U.N.
Doc. S/2002/1005 (Sept. 10, 2002). Among other things, these forces were to provide
security for the mission, including security for the disarmament and demobilization
process. The operation was to include command, combat and support elements and
to be structured around a well-equipped infantry battalion, with an armed helicopter
unit for support. Id. at 1 49, 50, 76.
293. S.C. Res. 1484, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1484 (May 30, 2003).
294. This force, also known as "Operations Artemis," was authorized to "take all
necessary measures to fulfill its mandate." Id., T 4. The force was led by the
European Union with France as the main contributor. It deployed in Bunia on June
6, 2003. PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES, UNIT MILITARY DIVISION, OPERATION
ARTEMIS: THE LESSONS OF THE INTERIM EMERGENCY FORCE 4, available at
<www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPU/Document.aspx?docid=572>.
295. This force was authorized to work in close coordination with MONUC "to
contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the
humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally
displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute
to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the
humanitarian presence in the town." S.C. Res. 1484, Id.
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troop levels to 10,8006 and, acting under Chapter VII, reiterated
MONUC's civilian protection mandate.2" For certain parts of the
country, however, MONUC's mandate was made even more forceful.
The Security Council authorized it to use "all necessary means to
fulfill its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems it within its
capabilities, in North and South Kivu.''298 When the IEMF withdrew
in September 2003, it handed over its remaining tasks in Bunia to
the strengthened MONUC.3°°
After a serious deterioration of the security situation in the
summer of 2004,31 the Security Council again raised the MONUC's
troop numbers - this time to 16,700' - and revised its mandate
giving it additional tasks of a forceful nature.3°3 In order to carry out
296. S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 269, at 3. The increase in troops was to provide
protection to the U.N. personnel and assets and establish a framework of security, as
well as providing limited support to some humanitarian operations. The Secretary-
General, Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 48, U.N. Doc.
S/2003/566, (May 27, 2003).
297. Id. at 25.
298. Id. at 26. By August 26, 2003, the Security Council authorized the IMEF in
Bunia to provide assistance to the MONUC contingent deployed in Bunia and its
immediate surroundings, if MONUC so requested and if exceptional circumstances
so demanded. S.C. Res. 1501, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1501 (Aug. 26, 2003).
299. According to the Secretary-General, the operation had been successful in
restoring a measure of security in the town. The Secretary-General, Fourteenth
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1098 (Nov. 17, 2003).
300. See discussion regarding "Operation Artemis," supra note 294.
301. In May and June 2004, dissident elements took over Bukavu, which led to
widespread abuse and looting. There were also serious attacks against the personnel
and property of MONUC. In August 2004, there was a massacre of Congolese
Banyamulenge refugees in Gatumba, Burundi. See The Secretary-General, Third
Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 37, 39, 45, U.N. Doc. S/2004/650 (Aug.
13, 2004). See also The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 3 September 2004 from the
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2004/715 (Sept. 7, 2004).
302. The Secretary-General had requested an additional 13,100 personnel, almost
exclusively for military purposes. The Secretary-General, supra note 301,
at 82-102.
303. S.C. Res. 1565, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1565 (Oct. 1, 2004). The mandated tasks
may be divided into three categories, all falling under Chapter VII. First, MONUC
was given tasks not requiring the use of force, such as assisting in the promotion of
human rights and observing troop movements. Second, the Security Council, once
again, gave MONUC a civilian protection mandate. Finally, MONUC was given
tasks that appeared likely to require the use of considerable offensive force, such as
seizing and disposing of arms and conducting inspections to ensure the arms embargo
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these tasks MONUC was authorized to use "all necessary means,
within its capacity and in the areas where its armed units are
deployed."' ' In September" and October 2005,306 in the face of
continued violence, the Security Council authorized a further increase
in personnel. Several other increases have been authorized since that
time.' In April 2006, the Security Council authorized, for a period
ending four months after the date of the first round of presidential
and parliamentary elections, the temporary deployment of a
European Union-led quasi-enforcement Reserve Force ("EUFOR
RD Congo") to support MONUC.
b. Cote D'Ivoire (April 2004 - Present)
In February 2004,"0 the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII, established UNOCI to replace two previous United Nations-
sanctioned missions. One of the departing missions,3 ° the ECOWAS
Mission in C6te d'Ivoire ("ECOMICI"),3" was a COTW-led quasi-
enforcement operation that had been authorized, "together with the
French forces supporting them," to provide security guarantees in the
country. UNOCI was to act in cooperation with the French forces,
was being complied with.
304. Id. at 6. Note that the "all necessary means" language did not apply to the
tasks in the first category -just to those tasks in the second and third categories. See
discussion supra note 303 regarding the categories.
305. S.C. Res. 1621, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1621 (Sept. 6, 2005).
306. S.C. Res. 1635, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1635 (Oct. 28, 2005). This was a temporary
increase of 300 personnel "to allow for the deployment of an infantry battalion in
Katanga."
307. In April 2006 the Security Council authorized the temporary redeployment of
troops from the United Nations Observer Mission in Burundi to MONUC. S.C. Res.
1669, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1669 (Apr. 7, 2006). This was extended by S.C. Res. 1692,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1692 (June 30, 2006) and S.C. Res. 1711, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1711
(Sept. 29, 2006). In December 2006, a further increase of 916 military personnel was
authorized. S.C. Res. 1736, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1736 (Dec. 22, 2006).
308. S.C. Res. 1671, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1671 (Apr. 25, 2006).
309. S.C. Res. 1528, supra note 283.
310. The other was the United Nations Mission in C6te D'Ivoire (MINUCI)
established in May 2003 by the Security Council to facilitate a January 2003 peace
agreement (the "Linas-Marcoussis Agreement"). MINUCI, which was present in
C6te d'Ivoire from May 2003 to April 2004, is described on the DPKO website as a
"political mission" rather than peacekeeping. See United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping website, <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.
311. Also referred to as "ECOFORCE."
312. S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464 (Feb. 4, 2003). ECOWAS, at its
Summit in Accra on Sept. 29, 2002, had taken the decision to deploy a regional
peacekeeping force in C6te D'Ivoire. This force, which was joined by French forces,
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which were to remain.1 3 UNOCI was authorized "to use all necessary
means to carry out its mandate within its capabilities and its areas of
deployment,"3 '4  which included monitoring the cease-fire,
disarmament and civilian protection. 5 When the security situation
worsened in November 2004, the Secretary-General wrote to the
President of the Security Council asking for reassurance that UNOCI
was "authorized to use all necessary means, within its capabilities and
areas of deployment, to prevent hostile action." '316 This assurance was
317given on the same day.
In June 2005,318 the Security Council, again acting under Chapter
VII, increased the size of UNOCI and expanded its mandate,
authorizing it to undertake several forceful tasks, including observing
and monitoring "the implementation of the joint declaration of the
end of the war of April 6, 2005," preventing, "within its capabilities
and its areas of deployment, any hostile action," monitoring the arms
embargo, and assisting with security measures.1 9  In the same
resolution, the Security Council authorized UNOCI "to use all
necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and
its areas of deployment. 3 20 In January 2007, UNOCI's mandate was
was later welcomed by the Security Council in S.C. Res. 1464.
313. The Security Council renewed its authorization of the French force, known as
"Operation Licorne," authorizing it to "use all necessary means in order to support
UNOCI." S.C. Res. 1528, supra note 283, 16. In particular, the French force was
authorized to "intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose
security may be threatened," and to "intervene against belligerent actions, if the
security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI." Id.
at $ 16. In June 2005 the Security Council reiterated the authority of the French
force to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI. S.C. Res. 1609, 12,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1609 (June 24, 2005).
314. S.C. Res. 1528, supra note 283, 8. UNOCI was to have a maximum military
strength of 6,240 in addition to "the appropriate civilian, judiciary and corrections
component." Id. at 2.
315. Id. at 6.
316. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 6 November 2004 from the Secretary-
General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/886,
(Nov. 6, 2004). The request dealt with a "Zone of Confidence" where UNOCI and
the French forces were deployed and which had been agreed with the Ivorian parties.
317. The President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/42 (Nov. 6, 2004). The statement added
that the Security Council "confirms also that UNOCI, within its capabilities and areas
of deployment, is authorized to prevent any hostile action, in particular within the
Zone of Confidence."
318. S.C. Res. 1609, supra note 313.
319. Id. at$ 3.
320. Id. at $ 8.
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further augmented . It was given a variety of new tasks, some of
which were military in nature (e.g., disarming militia and the
collection and disposal of materiel brought into the country in
violation of the arms embargo) and its authorization to "use all
necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and
its areas of deployment" was restated.
C. Impact on the Self-Defense Principle
1. Missions with Civilian Protection Mandates
A mandate that provides for the security of the peacekeepers
themselves is, of course, not unusual. As discussed above, it has long
been the case that the term "self-defense" has been considered to
include the defense of U.N. personnel and premises as well as the
protection of freedom of movement of U.N. personnel. What is
unusual is the Security Council's decision to specifically authorize the
missions under Chapter VII322 and to do so without any reference to
the self-defense principle 32 ' Even more remarkable is the Security
Council's decision to authorize peacekeepers to protect civilians
(where the peacekeepers are capable doing so and within the area of
their mission's deployment) and to specifically invoke Chapter VII in
this regard.324 This provides a clear illustration of the acceptance on
the part of the Security Council of the position that peacekeeping
321. S.C. Res. 1739, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1739 (Jan. 10, 2007).
322. In October 1999, when the civilian protection mandate was put in place for
UNAMSIL, Chapter VII had only been explicitly invoked with five peacekeeping
missions: UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II, UNCRO, UNTAES, and UNMIK. With
three of these missions - UNCRO, UNTAES, and UNMIK - the invocation of
Chapter VII appeared to be in order to authorize enforcement action by a COTW-
led operation which was considered in the same resolution. Regarding UNCRO and
UNTAES see the discussion supra note 131; regarding UNMIK, see the discussion
supra note 232.
323. Although the principle of self-defense is rarely discussed in Security Council
resolutions setting out the mandate for a mission, given that these civilian protection
mandates specifically authorize the use of force and do so under Chapter VII a
reiteration of the self-defense principle would be more important than ever in
providing clarity as to whether the Security Council continued to adhere to the
principle or not. For example, with UNPROFOR, the Security Council was at pains
to emphasize the self-defense principle in the same resolution authorizing the use of
force under Chapter VII. See S.C. Res. 836, supra note 119.
324. While several earlier Security Council resolutions have dealt with (or
impacted upon) the protection of civilians (e.g., ONUC, UNPROFOR, UNMIH,
UNAMIR I, UNAMIR II, UNOSOM II, UNCRO, and UNTAES), this is the first
time it explicitly invoked Chapter VII for this endeavor.
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operations have an obligation to protect civilians on the ground.3'
While a requirement that peacekeepers protect individuals under
their care might fit within some conceptions of self-defense at the
national level,326 these mandates go much further, referring to all
civilians under imminent threat within a mission's area of operation
and subject to its capabilities. Depending on the interpretation of
"imminent," "area of operation," and "capabilities," this could
require the peacekeeping operation to protect hundreds, or hundreds
of thousands of people. The possibility of such a large number of
protected persons, when combined with the invocation of Chapter
VII and the lack of a reference to self-defense, indicates that what is
envisaged with these civilian protection mandates is the use of
offensive force, potentially at any rate. Certainly there is nothing in
the wording of the mandates which would prevent a mission from
using extremely forceful actions or even pre-emptive force.327
As such, we are left to conclude that the Security Council's
actions in bestowing a civilian protection mandate on peacekeeping
operations mean that the self-defense principle has, once again, been
abandoned by the Security Council. To conclude that the self-
defense principle still stands but that the definition of self-defense has
been expanded to include the protection of possibly thousands of
civilians on the ground,3 , would be at variance with the normal
meaning of the concept of self-defense at best, and disingenuous at
worst. Nevertheless, the U.N. Secretariat appears to favor such a
325. The Security Council indicated its intention to ensure that peacekeeping
missions are given mandates to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical
danger in S.C. Res. 1296, supra note 245. The focus on civilian protection also
emerged from the Brahimi Report and the Security Council's endorsement thereof.
See supra notes 263-265 and corresponding text.
326. See supra note 35 for a discussion of two instances of national conceptions of
self-defense.
327. Holt notes that the nature of the protection may need to take a pre-emptive
form:
If a force charged with protection reacts to an attack on civilians after the
fact, it will already have failed in its goal of providing protection. As a
result, success will often require taking aggressive action prior to any
attack .... Protection may include, for example, escorting individuals and
protecting camps, safe areas, key roads. It could also require direct action to
target bad actors or prevent such actors from operating.
Holt, supra note 267, at 19.
328. Another, equally unpersuasive approach would be to classify the protection
of civilians failing with the category of "defense of the mandate" and therefore as
self-defense.
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definition. As recently as 2003 the U.N. Secretariat described self-
defense as follows: "Self-defence includes the right to protect oneself,
other U.N. personnel, U.N. property and any other persons under
U.N. protection.
3 29
2. Missions with Robust Mandates
Professor Christine Gray's observation that missions with robust
mandates mark "a reversion to the practice in the former Yugoslavia
and Somalia"' 3 is apt. Indeed the mandates of some of the missions
suggest an intention to go even further down the path of forcefulness
than the Security Council did in the former Yugoslavia. There, unlike
with the robust mandates under consideration, the mission's authority
to use considerable force was counter-balanced by an explicit, if
contradictory, reference to the need to use force only in self-
defense.33 With the robust mandates, the Security Council explicitly
invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, with several, authorized
the use of "all necessary means" - a phrase described by one
observer as "standard Security Council shorthand for military
force., 3 2 With the use of this phrase, the Security Council sends the
message: Use whatever means you must. Clearly such a message is
incompatible with a limitation on force only in self-defense, even one
that is extremely widely drawn. A further indication that the self-
defense principle is not meant to apply to the robust mandates arises
329. UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, supra
note 13.
330. GRAY, 2d ed., supra note 69, at 238. Her observation, written in 2004, was in
relation to UNAMSIL and MONUC; it would apply equally to other missions with
robust mandates.
331. See supra notes 181-187.
332. Charles Pierson, Preemptive Self-Defense in an Age of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 150, 153 (2004-2005). The phrase had
historically been used only to authorize full-blown enforcement actions, such as that
in Iraq in Security Resolution 678. U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). In Korea
the language was similar, but not identical; there the Security Council authorized
states to "furnish [the South with] such assistance... as may be necessary." S.C. Res.
83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950). Beginning in the 1990s the Security Council
used the language for quasi-enforcement operations. For example, Operation
Turquoise in Rwanda, the NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia and US-led
MNF in Haiti were authorized to use "all necessary means" to achieve certain aspects
of their mandates. Even with such forces, however, the Security Council was at times
reluctant to use this forceful wording. See Christine Gray, From Unity to
Polarization: Unity and the Use of Force against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. of INT'L L. 1, 5 n.1
(2002). For a consideration of the language used with robust peacekeeping
operations, see the discussion in supra note 283.
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from the fact that, in many cases, the operations were envisaged as
replacements for enforcement operations, oftentimes with troops
from quasi-enforcement forces simply being re-hatted as
"peacekeepers."
The analysis of the robust mandates confirms the conclusion
arrived at above in relation to civilian protection mandates: The self-
defense principle has been abandoned by the Security Council. Even
the U.N. DPKO, previously prone to stress the self-defense principle
(even though expansively drawn), seems to acknowledge that it is not
possible to attempt to fit "all necessary means" within even the
broadest conception of self-defense. In its December 2003
Peacekeeping Handbook,3 33 it concedes that "sometimes the Security
Council will authorize a peacekeeping operation to use armed force
in situations other than in self-defence., 334  It would appear that
peacekeeping, as now understood by the Security Council and
Secretariat at any rate,335 may involve the use of considerable force,
well beyond self-defense. As outlined in a news briefing by Margaret
Carey, an officer in the Africa Division of the DPKO, speaking in
New York in March 2005: "There has been a change in peace-
keeping .... We do military operations .... Peacekeeping is robust
now. ,,336
333. UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, supra
note 13.
334. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
335. However, recognition that peacekeeping operations are not always bound by
the self-defense principle is not universally accepted within the United Nations. The
U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations continues to stress the
importance of force only in self-defence. In its 2004 Report it provided: "The Special
Committee believes that respect for the basic principles of peacekeeping, such as the
consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence, is
essential to its success." Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
and its Working Group at the 2004 Substantive Session, 36, U.N. Doc. A/58/19 (Apr.
26, 2004). Interestingly however, in its Reports in 2005 and 2006, the same paragraph
was reproduced with a modification: "the non-use of force except in self-defence"
was replaced with "the non-use of force except in self-defence and in the defence of a
mandate authorized by the Security Council." (emphasis added) Report of the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2005
Substantive Session, 30, U.N. Doc. A/59/19/Rev.1 (undated) and Report of the
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2006
Substantive Session, 36, U.N. Doc. A/60/19 (Mar. 22, 2004).
336. Marc Lacey, Congo Tribal Killings Create a New Wave of Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, § 1 at 13.
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V. The Future: Is Forceful Peacekeeping Sustainable?
Does the United Nations' most recent foray into forceful
peacekeeping represent, once again, a temporary experiment, with it
being only a matter of time before it reverts to its more cautious, self-
defense-oriented approach to peacekeeping? Of course, in large
measure, the answer to the question lies in whether the operations
using force beyond self-defense are judged successful. This may be
measured in a number of ways. One approach is to ask if civilians on
the ground have been better protected than they would otherwise
have been. Annan's observation as late as 2004 that civilians continue
to "bear the brunt to armed conflicts" notwithstanding the presence
of forceful peacekeeping forces proves little;337 no matter how
successful a peacekeeping presence is, it would be unreasonable to
expect it to result in the complete elimination of attacks against
civilians or the establishment of a perfect security situation. It would
appear that, in all but the most extraordinary circumstances,
mandating peacekeepers to protect civilians will lead to fewer attacks.
However, to compare the level of civilian protection available under a
peacekeeping operation with enforcement-type powers with that
provided by a peacekeeping operation using force only in self-defense
is to make the wrong comparison. Instead, one should compare the
civilian protection offered by a forceful peacekeeping operation with
that provided by an enforcement operation. After all, bestowing
forceful powers on peacekeeping operations means there will be
fewer enforcement operations with mandates of shorter duration. By
putting in place a regime of forceful peacekeeping, the United
Nations is to a certain degree letting those states which would
otherwise be morally obliged to contribute to U.N. enforcement
forces "off the hook." When states do agree to participate in a quasi-
enforcement operation (often after much foot dragging), they will
tend to insist that their participation in the operation be for a short
time only and that the quasi-enforcement operation be replaced by a
forceful peacekeeping operation.338 This has led, in some cases, to
337. In a 2004 report to the Security Council, Kofi Annan reflects on what civilian
protection mandates had achieved. He noted that the "[s]tark and disturbing
evidence that civilians continue to bear the brunt of armed conflicts" and in support
of this cited two examples where peacekeeping missions with civilian protection
mandates were operational. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General
to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, T[ 3, U.N.
Doc. S/2004/431 (May 28, 2004).
338. For example, the United States' participation in the quasi-enforcement force
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overly hasty transitions from a quasi-enforcement operation to a
forceful peacekeeping mission. As a result, the situation on the
ground in which the peacekeeping operation has to function will
frequently be far from stable and secure; and this in turn has led to
the granting of greater and greater enforcement-type powers to the
peacekeeping operation. Of course, this is reminiscent of the
transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, discussed above, which
ended so disastrously.
Another approach is to consider some of the problems associated
with forceful U.N. peacekeeping, many of which were applicable in
the forceful peacekeeping operations of earlier years. I divide these
difficulties into four categories. First, constant pressures on resources
are likely to lead to peacekeeping missions with personnel and
resources which are insufficient to accomplish their more forceful
mandates. Despite the emphasis in the Brahimi Report on the
importance of granting robust peacekeeping operations adequate
personnel and resources, the problem remains. Indeed the imposition
of a forceful mandate may actually lead to states being less willing to
contribute troops.3 39  The example of MONUC is illustrative.
Katarina Mdnsson notes a "mismatch" between MONUC's initial
civilian protection mandate, "and the resources allocated for its
implementation: 5,537 troops were authorized to carry out complex
tasks throughout a territory the size of Western Europe."''
Moreover, despite continued attacks on civilians, in February 2001
Annan introduced an updated concept of operations, requiring only
in Liberia was of a very limited duration. While the United States positioned a task
force of over 2,000 marines off the coast of the country on August 4, 2003, in aid of
the Multinational Force (authorized by S.C. Res. 1497, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497
(Aug. 1, 2003)), it declared its intention to withdraw its forces in whole or in part by 1
October 2003. See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General to the
Security Council on Liberia, 12, 59, U.N. Doc. S/2003/875 (Sept. 11, 2003). One of
the functions of the Multinational Force was to prepare for the introduction of a U.N.
peacekeeping force. S.C. Res. 1497, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003).
339. See The High Level Panel's Report, which notes that Chapter VII mandates are
"not always welcomed by troop contributors." Kofi Annan, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, 213 (2004), available at <www.un.org/
secureworld/report3.pdf>. Moreover, U.N. statistics of member state participating in
forceful operations indicate that the decrease in willingness to contribute troops to
peacekeeping missions which have been authorized to use considerable force is most
striking with developed states. See, e.g., United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
website, available at <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ contributors/95-05.htm>.
340. S.C. Res. 1291, supra note 276.
341. See MAnsson, supra note 62, at 505.
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3,000 troops, reducing the original force by almost half, apparently
due to the unwillingness of states to contribute troops.342 Later,343 the
Security Council authorized "merely half (5,900 personnel) the force
requested by Annan, who deplored this limitation affecting
MONUC's tasks."344 In an October 2005 address to the General
Assembly, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Operations noted that "[o]ur personnel in the field ... operate in
many instances on a more or less permanent state of shortfall ....
Overstretch ... undermines our capacity to manage operations
effectively.""
A second difficulty with the increased forcefulness in
peacekeeping operations is the risk that parties on the ground will no
longer perceive the operations to be impartial and unthreatening.
This would appear to have been a factor in some attacks against U.N.
forces or the taking of such forces hostage, for example in Somalia in
1993, in the Former Yugoslavia in 1995, and in Sierra Leone in 2000.
More recently, in February 2005, nine MONUC peacekeepers were
killed in the Ituri region in what was described as a retaliatory
attack 4' A peacekeeping operation's impartiality may be further
imperiled where the peacekeeping mission and the quasi-enforcement
mission operate at the same time. As we saw in the former
342. As noted by MAnsson,
One would assume that the unwillingness of states to contribute troops was
the main reason for this reduction: as the Secretary-General was writing his
report only 200 military personnel had been deployed to the [Democratic
Republic of the Congo]. When peace operations are endowed with an
enforcement mandate, member states are less prone to contribute troops.
Id. at 507.
343. S.C. Res. 1565, supra note 303.
344. See Mgnsson, supra note 62, at 514.
345. Jean-Marie Gu6henno, Under-Secretary-General for United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, Remarks to the Fourth Committee of the General
Assembly, (Oct. 20, 2005), available at <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/
article201005.htm>.
346. As noted by Gray, "UNAMSIL was not able to fulfill [its] wide mandate
when the opposition forces resorted to violence in 2000. Hundreds of UN forces
were taken hostage by the Rebel RUF." GRAY, 1st ed., supra note 80 at 181.
347. According to newspaper accounts there was "some suspicion... that the
attack on the peacekeepers was in retaliation for the recent effort to confront the
militias." Marc Lacey, Militia Fighters Kill 9 U.N. Peacekeepers in Congo as
Instability Continues, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2005, § A6. As noted by M~insson,
MONUC presents its own set of problems regarding perceptions of bias: "The use of
force to protect civilians in certain areas rather than others could undermine the
perception of peacekeepers as impartial." See MAnsson, supra note 62, at 515.
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Yugoslavia in the early 1990s when the NATO-led force and
UNPROFOR operated at the same time, it was not always clear to
the people on the ground to which entity the use of force should be
attributed. This led to a perception that the use of force by NATO
was the use of force by UNPROFOR.
Third, with an increase in robustness comes increased
expectations. When these heightened expectations are not met - as
348will almost invariably be the case - there is the risk that the
mission, and peacekeeping as a whole, will be pilloried. An example
here is the criticism leveled against MONUC troops, who, despite
having a civilian protection mandate at the time, reportedly stood by
as Hema UPC forces, backed by Rwanda, took over Bunia in May
2003."4  Similar criticisms have arisen with the MINUSTAH's
reluctance to use force, with many Haitians describing them as being
in the country "on vacation."3 °  Such complaints prompted its
commander, General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro, to remark: "I
command a peacekeeping force, not an occupation force. ' ' 351 These
criticisms echo the criticisms that the robust peacekeeping in the
348. It could be argued that the movement away from the self-defense principle
merely shifts the decision that the peacekeeping operation is not able to achieve its
goals through force of arms further down the chain of command. So if, for example,
a genocide was occurring in a country which had a robust peacekeeping operation
with a civilian mandate, the decision as to whether to use force - and if so how
much - would fall to the force commander. This would make force commander the
lightening rod for criticism if he was unwilling to request his troops to engage in the
use of combat-type force in circumstances likely to be unacceptably costly in
peacekeepers' lives (thereby insulating Security Council and the Secretariat from the
harsh criticism each received in the context of the genocide in Rwanda). Moreover,
even if the force commander took the decision to use offensive force in dangerous
circumstances, there is every likelihood that the troops would "double check" with
the authorities in their home states - with the possible result that they would be told
to disregard the force commander's order. This "red carding" of peacekeepers by
their own governments has occurred in the past and is likely to reoccur.
Furthermore, where a forceful engagement by a peacekeeping operation resulted in
significant casualties, there would be every possibility that peacekeepers would be
unilaterally withdrawn by their governments. See Dallaire, supra note 156, at 293-
296, regarding the withdrawal of the Belgian forces from UNAMIR.
349. James Astill, UN Troops Wait Behind Razor Wire as Congo's Streets Run with
Blood: James Astill in Bunia, Congo, Where Thousands Have Died in Ethnic
Violence, GUARDIAN (London), May 23, 2003, at 1.
350. Michael Kamber, A Troubled Haiti Struggles to Gain Its Political Balance,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, §1 at 11. The article further noted that former U.S.
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former Yugoslavia did not meet expectations.352
Finally, if peacekeeping operations use offensive force, the
protection afforded peacekeepers will change fundamentally. As is
well known, international humanitarian law classifies individuals as
combatants or non-combatants and as military or civilians.
Peacekeepers who use force only in self-defense would appear to fall
into the categories of non-combatant military;3. 3 as such, like civilians,
they are not legitimate targets for combatants."4 However, where a
peacekeeper uses force beyond self-defense, he or she becomes a
combatant under international humanitarian law and, as such, a
legitimate target.35 This will undoubtedly lead to the routine
352. Gray observes that the "use of Chapter VII in the resolutions on
UNPROFOR, UNCRO, and UNTAES increased expectations as to what they might
achieve, but did not in itself give these forces enforcement powers in the absence of
further express provision. The lack of realistic mandates and of adequate resources
meant that the forces were not able to fulfill the expectations raised." GRAY, 2d ed.,
supra note 69, at 221.
353. "Nothing in this Convention shall be construed so as to derogate from the
right to act in self-defence." Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel, art. 21, U.N. Doc A/49/49 (1994).
354. The status of peacekeepers is enshrined in the Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel which, at Art. 7(1), provides that "United
Nations and associated personnel, their equipment and premises shall not be made
the object of attack or of any action that prevents them from discharging their
mandate." However, Art. 2(2) provides an exception for "a United Nations
operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as
combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of international
armed conflict applies" (emphasis added). See also the Rome Statute on the
International Criminal Court, which provides that a person shall not be criminally
responsible where he or she "acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another
person ... against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate
to the degree of danger .... Rome Statute, supra note 46, Art. 31(1)(c).
355. The applicability of certain fundamental rules and principles of international
humanitarian law to U.N. forces "when in situations of armed conflict they are actively
engaged therein as combatants to the extent and for the duration of their engagement"
was confirmed by the Secretary-General in his 6 August 1999 Bulletin on the
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, Art. 1.1, U.N.
Doc. St/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1656 (1999). The Bulletin
specifically provides at Art. 1.1 that the rules and principles were "applicable in
enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted
in self-defence." At Art. 1.2, it provides that it "does not affect the protected status of
members of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel or their status as non-combatants, as long as
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law of
armed conflict." See Daphna Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of
International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 406 (2000); Stevens, supra note 34, at 157.
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targeting of U.N. forces - even where the particular peacekeeping
mission at the particular time is not engaging in enforcement
functions. The significance of such a development on U.N.
peacekeeping cannot be underestimated.
If history provides us with an accurate guide, it would appear to
be only a matter of time before the United Nations again reaches the
realization that the use of force beyond self-defense is fundamentally
incompatible with the concept of peacekeeping and retreats to an
approach whereby some variation on the self-defense principle is
again embraced. The problems, as outlined, are considerable and will
only grow worse as more and more forceful peacekeeping operations
come into existence.
While the idea behind the increased forcefulness is laudable - a
recognition that the United Nations and, through it, the international
community, has a responsibility to protect civilian populations from
serious atrocities and to restore peace and security - peacekeeping is
not the means to achieve the goals where force beyond self-defense is
required . If the international community is serious about its
responsibility to provide civilian protection, a means to do so already
exists: enforcement operations. In the words of Professor, now Judge,
Rosalyn Higgins writing in 1995, "Enforcement should remain clearly
differentiated from peace-keeping. Peace-keeping mandates should
not contain within them an enforcement function. To speak of the
need for more 'muscular peace-keeping' simply evidences that the
wrong mandate has been chosen ab initio.' ,35 7 This is no less true in
2007.
356. White makes the following observation:
The problem with peacekeeping is that it cannot provide the answer to
situations where conflict, whether international or civil, still rages. In such
situations the need to restore peace, as opposed to keeping it, requires an
enforcement action under chapter VII of the Charter. Overall, the weakness
of the UN system is not so much its peacekeeping operations (although they
can be considerably improved), but its deficient military enforcement actions
which have depended upon "coalitions of the willing" coming forward ....
Thus any reform in the military responses of the UN must look at the system
overall and identify whether peacekeeping under "chapter VI and a half," or
enforcement under chapter VII, is needed.
White, supra note 249, at 128, 129.
357. Higgins, supra note 103, at 459.
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